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| 1 |
ID:
122318
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
How do we characterize and explain the behavioral patterns of the Chinese bureaucracy amid China's great transformation over the past three decades? The prevailing "tournament competition" model presented in the literature emphasizes the role of incentive design to explain bureaucratic behaviors. We develop an alternative model of "muddling through"-characterized by a reactive response to multiple pressures, constant readjustments and a focus on short-term gains-to explain the behavioral patterns of China's intermediate government agencies. We explain the underlying multiple bureaucratic logics that induce these behavioral patterns and the institutional conditions under which such behavioral patterns prevail. We illustrate the research issues, analytical concepts and theoretical arguments, using a case study of a municipal environmental protection bureau implementing the Five-Year Plan, between 2006 and 2010.
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| 2 |
ID:
131838
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
FOREIGN POLICY of any state is a product and a common denominator of different and frequently opposite interests. Their combinations vary from country to country even if the process as a whole is affected by general global and social regularities, motivations and mechanisms. The relations between the United States and China have been and will probably remain in the field of interdependence and conflict.
Which factors are responsible for these motivations in China? How stable are they and how deeply rooted in the context of internal dynamics and the development logic of the Chinese socium? What social forces and institutions personify and determine them? Which mechanisms do Chinese politicians employ when seeking a compromise and the common denominator in their relationships with the United States?
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| 3 |
ID:
113933
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The low degree of institutionalization of Chinese administration means that citizens engaging with the bureaucracy have a choice of strategies to achieve objectives. This article deploys Asia Barometer survey data from 2006 to construct a predictive model of preferences to obtain a government permit, including use of connections (guanxi), bribery, writing letters, waiting patiently, and the passive-pessimistic response "nothing can be done". It finds that strategy preference varies according to location (urban or rural interacting with region), socio-economic status, social capital, political values and political performance evaluations. The pattern of determinants shows that Chinese citizens are cross-pressured. The class and gender nature of guanxi and bribery are an obstacle to the creation of a modern Chinese state, but high levels of social trust, support for political freedom, the market and meritocracy combined with the reservoir of trust enjoyed by executive organs present a favourable climate for efforts to improve governance.
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| 4 |
ID:
031991
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| Publication |
Boulder, Westview Press, 1983.
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| Description |
xii, 155p.pbk
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| Series |
Westview Replica Editions
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| Standard Number |
0865319812
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 022732 | 951.05/MOR 022732 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 5 |
ID:
176603
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| Summary/Abstract |
Drawing on insights from recent economic theories of incomplete contracts, we develop a theoretical model on authority relationships in the Chinese bureaucracy by conceptualizing the allocation of control rights in goal setting, inspections, and provision of incentives among the principal, supervisor, and agents. Variations in the allocation of these control rights give rise to different modes of governance and entail distinct behavioral implications among the parties. The proposed model provides a unified framework and a set of analytical concepts to examine different governance structures, varying authority relationships, and the specific principal-agent problems entailed in a bureaucratic setting. We will illustrate this through a case study of authority relationships and ensuing behavioral patterns in the environmental protection arena over a five-year cycle of policy implementation.
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