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| 1 |
ID:
113961
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The world trading system is characterized by a growing number of free trade agreements (FTAs). Limited progress in the negotiations at the multilateral level within the WTO has contributed to this development, inducing countries to seek faster, alternative ways to speed up liberalization, which make it possible to take advantage of preferential treatment with key trading partners. This article discusses what role the WTO should take with regard to FTAs in times of stalled multilateral negotiations and proliferating FTAs, and how FTAs can contribute to the multilateralization of regionalism. When results at the multilateral level are scarce, there may be a shift towards other alternatives in which the WTO is left out. This may force the WTO to function reactively, simply facing facts as an organization, rather than proactively, where it may play some role in shaping the FTA development. FTAs are not an entirely separate phenomenon from the WTO, since countries that negotiate FTAs play two roles. They are members of the WTO and as such are part of the work and negotiations of the organization. They are also part of trade arrangements that are limited to a smaller number of countries, and hence can negotiate against the interest of the entire multilateral organization. This article explores how these agreements can facilitate the work and negotiations of the WTO to regionalize bilateralism and multilateralize regionalism, here named the "sticky rice" approach. Various East Asian trade arrangements are used as empirical examples.
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| 2 |
ID:
126934
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| 3 |
ID:
118175
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) limit member-states' trade policy discretion; consequently, policy uncertainty is mitigated. Reductions in policy uncertainty stemming from accession to a PTA improve the resource allocation decisions of the voters and reduce deadweight losses from the need to self-insure against policy uncertainty. The resultant increase in efficiency improves an incumbent government's-particularly a democratic government's-chance of surviving in office. We test this prediction using survival analysis, adjusting for potential selection biases using propensity score matching. We find robust support for the proposition that governments that sign PTAs survive longer in office than observationally similar governments that do not sign. In addition, we find that this effect is stronger in democracies than in autocracies.
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