| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
American-Iranian relations have always been the most significant variable in Iran's nuclear programme, yet, in the absence of direct diplomatic communication, have never been addressed during multilateral negotiations. Since 1979, misperceptions of each other's intentions and capabilities have prevented Iran and the United States from escaping an ambiguous "cold war" relationship. The decision of the Obama and Ahmadinejad governments to open negotiations in Switzerland in Autumn 2009 marked the first bilateral high-profile meeting between both countries in over thirty years. At this time Iran was dealing with the effects of its June presidential elections, which was Teheran's greatest crisis of legitimacy since the Islamic Revolution. In addition, Iran's power elite was informed by a siege mentality vis-à-vis its own people and the international community. Also at this time, the Barack Obama Administration decided to engage Teheran directly. The Iranian government failed to reciprocate American initiatives. The breakdown of talks has, in turn, produced a new United States-sponsored containment doctrine against Iran. Whilst Washington may have shed an exclusive reliance on belligerency, as was the case under President George W. Bush, coercion remains the basis of Iran policy. Within two years after the Obama Administration began experimenting with "two-track" diplomacy, the situation has returned to mutual hostility. The United States and Iran are conducting diplomacy with each other in bad faith.
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