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| 1 |
ID:
162834
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| Summary/Abstract |
During the first six months of the War of 1812, American frigates defeated three British frigates. These losses did little to affect Britain’s actual naval dominance, but the moral impact proved a bitter shock for the world’s pre-eminent naval power. Negative reactions rippled through the print media, the political public, and the naval officer corps, leading to questions about the very nature of British naval superiority. In response, British naval leaders made difficult choices about procurement and rules of engagement, minimizing the risks faced by British warships and protracting the naval conflict long enough to take advantage of American missteps.
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| 2 |
ID:
114413
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The British experience in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past decade has been characterised by an unprecedented focus on force protection. Far from remaining confined to the military domain, force protection evolved into a highly politicised issue, becoming a chosen symbol of governmental competence (or lack thereof) in the party-political confrontation of the 2010 general election. But to what extent was this politicisation an indication of more profound changes in British strategic culture? Mark Clegg shows how the political discourse of force protection between 2006 and 2010 did not, in fact, spill over into a strategic cultural change, but suggests that the issue will remain at the centre of British public debate for a long time to come.
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