| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
How can one state maintain deterrence against another state undergoing an uncertain political transition? A debate within fourth wave deterrence theory focuses on whether and when a tailored approach, based on cultural, organizational, and idiosyncratic characteristics of a target state, has the greatest value. Tailored deterrence may not be appropriate under conditions of domestic political uncertainty in the target state, often those most in need of deterring. A more promising alternative for a defending state may be deterrence management. Deterrence management compensates for insufficient or low-confidence assessments of a target's values, organizational structure, power distribution, or cultural idiosyncrasies that prevent employment of tailored deterrence strategies intended to manipulate such factors. To make this case, I combine insights from deterrence theory with an exploration of the uncertain politics of a post-Kim Jong-il North Korea and the unpredictable process of power consolidation. Deterrence management may be applicable in cases of imperceptible leadership transitions in other target states. While no panacea, the deterrence management approach reinforces stability while remaining flexible enough to accommodate change.
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