Srl | Item |
1 |
ID:
018087
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Publication |
Nov 2000.
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Description |
261-268
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2 |
ID:
017866
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Publication |
Nov 2000.
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Description |
4-6
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3 |
ID:
017850
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Publication |
Nov 2000.
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Description |
84-87
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4 |
ID:
018239
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Publication |
Nov 2000.
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Description |
489-512
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Summary/Abstract |
In the wake of repeated crackdowns on the 'three disorders' and 'small treasuries', it is obvious that local governments in China collect substantial amounts of illegal monies. What is not immediately obvious is how illegal monies matter. In this article, I assess both the amount of illegal monies that local governments collect and their significance relative to local autonomy. I find that because illegal monies are not rival to legal monies but rather complementary, although illegal monies may give local governments a greater ability to pursue their own particularistic agendas, they do not fundamentally alter the principalagent structures that link the localities to the center.
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5 |
ID:
018792
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Publication |
Nov 2000.
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Description |
10-15
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6 |
ID:
018240
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Publication |
Nov 2000.
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Description |
513-534
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Summary/Abstract |
This paper explains why rural enterprises prosper in the post-Mao reform era. Based on a case study of Shaanxi province, the paper argues that the institutional arrangements in rural China under economic reforms are conducive to sustained economic growth because the principal–agent problem is alleviated in two dimensions. First, the interests of local government officials and enterprises overlap. Prompted by the fiscal pressures on local governments as a result of the fiscal reforms, particularly the 1994 tax-assignment reform, local governments are eager to promote local industrial growth. Apart from absorbing rural surplus labour and contributing to the provision of communal welfare to local residents, rural enterprises provide local governments with tax and non-tax revenues to finance their expenditure obligations. In return, local governments provide preferential aid to their enterprises in the form of tax and credit privileges. Second, the principal–agent problem is abated by a closer effort-and-reward link for the various parties involved in the operation of rural enterprises.
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7 |
ID:
018237
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Publication |
Nov 2000.
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Description |
429-448
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Summary/Abstract |
With the aid of the 'butterfly effect' theory, this article investigates the role of ordinary individuals, both Chinese and American, in the formulation, implementation and promotion of 'Ping Pong Diplomacy', which brought about the US–China rapprochement in the early 1970s. Through examining the twists and turns in the process of 'Ping Pong Diplomacy' making, this study intends to bring one's attention to a number of seemingly less significant historical episodes and their long-term impact on US–China relations. Like small butterflies whose spontaneous actions can generate unexpected climatic changes, the various individuals in this study, including players and officials of the table-tennis teams, low-ranking diplomats and journalists, played an indispensable part in bringing forth a dramatic transformation in US–China relations, which in turn altered the Cold War climate in general.
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8 |
ID:
019649
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Publication |
Nov 2000.
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Description |
289-314
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9 |
ID:
017886
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Publication |
Nov 2000.
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Description |
36-40
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10 |
ID:
018146
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Publication |
Nov 2000.
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Description |
337-356
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11 |
ID:
018278
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Publication |
Nov 2000.
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Description |
21-28
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12 |
ID:
018090
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Publication |
Nov 2000.
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Description |
325-336
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13 |
ID:
017849
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Publication |
Nov 2000.
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Description |
77-80
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14 |
ID:
017887
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Publication |
Nov 2000.
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Description |
41-43
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15 |
ID:
018238
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Publication |
Nov 2000.
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Description |
467-488
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Summary/Abstract |
This study attempts to reveal the political dynamics of economic reforms in China through an analysis of the case of Beijing. As anywhere else in China, Beijing experienced rapid economic growth from 1978 through to 1994. During this period, Beijing's GDP increased four times; Beijing's foreign investment amounted to $26.1 billion and the number of foreign enterprises reached 10,196; and Beijing's people increased their income by a factor of 10. In the meantime, however, as in other places in China, Beijing witnessed more rampant corruption than ever in the history of the People's Republic. The world was shocked in 1995 by the news that a senior vice mayor of Beijing committed suicide and that the party secretary—a politburo member—was first placed under house arrest and then faced criminal charges because of corruption. The attack on Beijing by the center revealed another dynamic in the particular case of Beijing, that is, a strong capital can hardly coexist with the center. The strong capital may defy the power of the center, but the center has to control the capital to command the whole country. The struggle between the center and the capital resulted in the defeat of the capital, as was the case in the Cultural Revolution.
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16 |
ID:
017939
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Publication |
Nov 2000.
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Description |
383-388
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17 |
ID:
018150
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Publication |
Nov 2000.
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Description |
721-736
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18 |
ID:
019010
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Publication |
Nov 2000.
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Description |
1-31
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19 |
ID:
018337
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Publication |
Nov 2000.
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Description |
33-40
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20 |
ID:
017940
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Publication |
Nov 2000.
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Description |
389-395
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