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ID:
114746
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since its establishment in the early 1990s, the conventional missile component of the People's Liberation Army's Second Artillery Force (SAF) has emerged as a centerpiece of China's accelerating military modernization program. The conventional missile force has grown in size and sophistication, and China has developed a doctrine for its employment. Chinese military publications emphasize that it plays an increasingly important role in deterrence and warfighting. In particular, Chinese sources underscore its role in achieving information dominance, air superiority, and sea control as well as countering third-party intervention. China's development of advanced conventional missile capabilities highlights the growing vulnerability of fixed bases and surface ships. Moreover, organizational tendencies, could fuel dangerous escalation. In response to these challenges, the United States must adapt its traditional approach to military operations and deterrence in the Asia-Pacific.
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| 2 |
ID:
114748
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) pose international security threats. What cultural, political, and economic challenges stand in the way of setting up EID Surveillance infrastructure? Are there general principles that might guide engagement with developing countries and support such infrastructure? Using the US Naval Area Medical Research Unit 2 as a common denominator, this study compares barriers to EID surveillance in Cambodia and Indonesia and presents key factors that constrain disease surveillance systems. As extensive interviews revealed, low levels of development in general are the main impediments to building EID surveillance infrastructure and are perhaps beyond the scope of health and scientific agencies at this point. Ultimately, political economy matters and promoting greater understanding of these issues is a critical first step in mitigating negative outcomes.
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| 3 |
ID:
114747
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the Philippines, the armed forces have played a major role in the country's authoritarian past. Yet despite the advent of democracy, vestiges of authoritarianism have continued to linger. This article analyzes the successes and failures in the efforts of Philippine civilians to gain authority over their military in five areas of political decision making, with the objective of achieving consolidated democratic rule. The article argues that in the Philippines, civilians have made genuine progress in curtailing the influence of military in certain areas, while in others, the armed forces continue to challenge civilian prerogatives. The article concludes that the ability of the Philippine military to continue acting in breach of civilian supremacy in certain areas reflects an impediment to democratically elected authorities' power to govern effectively.
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| 4 |
ID:
114749
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explains the rise and fall of the so-called Taiwan independence policy during the period of 1988-2010. It defines the Taiwan independence policy as an internal political move by the Taiwanese government to establish Taiwan as a separate and sovereign political entity on the world stage. It reviews two existing prevailing theses - electoral politics and shifting identity - and points out their weaknesses, the former's being its indeterminacy and unfalsifiability, and the latter's being its inadequacy to explain policy change. A new explanation focusing on relative power shift (military balance, alliance strength, and diplomatic standing) and domestic constraints (resource and political constraints) is then proposed to explain the rise and fall of the Taiwan independence policy. A brief examination of the 1988-2010 cross-strait history lends strong support to the theory.
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| 5 |
ID:
114745
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article addresses the question of how US extended nuclear deterrence might endure in a shifting Asia-Pacific where the traditional nuclear order underpinning the credibility of US security guarantees is deteriorating. The Australian case study demonstrates how periods of nuclear order and disorder can inform a state's attitudes toward the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence. Australia's interest in a nuclear weapons capability from 1956 to 1972 was symptomatic of a period of nuclear disorder. This interest declined from the early 1970s due to changes in both the global and regional environments where the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons was relatively contained. This emerging, recognizable nuclear order diminished the interest in an indigenous nuclear weapons capability and led Canberra to rely on US extended nuclear deterrence. This order has remained fairly robust for more than 30 years. However, beyond 2012, we may yet witness a breakdown in this order. This will generate a much greater interest by US allies in the operational aspects of US extended nuclear deterrence.
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