Publication |
2011.
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Summary/Abstract |
In the absence of a credible numbers-based theory of counterinsurgency there
can be no objective, numbers-based assessment for Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM. The U.S. military nonetheless has attempted to conduct a numbersbased assessment process. Thus, when a new commander and staff take over duties as a regional command in Afghanistan, they inherit an operations assessment process riddled with highly visible flaws that emanate from the improper
use of numbers and flawed logic. While no assessment process can be perfect or
free of any criticism, the flaws the author observed during a six-week stint
in-country are sufficiently egregious that they seriously reduce the value those
assessments provide to commanders' decision support. In addition, the visibility of these flaws means
that military assessments, and by association the military commanders, are rightfully distrusted by higher
civilian authority and by other organizations within
the theater. It is therefore imperative that incoming
commanders and staffs taking over responsibilities for
regional commands address these flaws to improve
decision making and to earn the trust of higher civilian authority and organizations with whom they have
to work.
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