| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
148118
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
While the implementation of decentralization in Ukraine holds promise for improving the weak state of consociationalism there, the framing of the issue along regionally distinct lines persists. After a discussion of how preferences for “decentralization” over “federalization” have been inspired in Ukraine, the article evaluates the significance of these terms beyond sociopolitical stratification, that is, their relevance for constitutional reform of unitary states. Belgium and Spain, two countries that transitioned from unitary states to federal and decentralized systems (respectively) are viewed as instructive cases here. Overall, it is found that either approach abets successful devolutionary federalism if accompanied by ongoing, underlying measures to improve consociationalism.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
190751
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the federalization process and the spread of federalism in Russia after 1991. The Russian federal system has undergone several changes since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It arose as a result of several contracts signed between the federal government and the subjects. The federal structure of Russia is asymmetric and characterized by conflicts due to the system of division of power between the federal government and the subjects. The creation of an institutional mechanism was done to facilitate the application of the federal principles effectively. The President’s full control over political affairs, foreign policy and the economy can harm the successful development of the federal state in Russia.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
115025
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2012.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
In 2005, after the making of the Constitution of Iraq and the making of Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement, many analysts expected the imminent break-up of Iraq, and that the South Sudanese would eventually opt for federalism and power-sharing rather than secede from Sudan. Six remarkable parallels in the histories of Iraq and Sudan suggest that analysts should have predicted that the Kurds and the South Sudanese would have been equally ardent secessionists in the early twenty-first century. Yet Kurdish nationalist leaders chose federalization in and after 2005, whereas South Sudanese nationalists eventually chose secession after a brief federal power-sharing experiment. The different choices of the respective nationalist leaders were therefore critical, but some plausible explanations of their different choices do not withstand scrutiny. The differing outcomes, so far, are necessarily but not sufficiently explained by the different geopolitical neighbourhoods of Iraq and Sudan. The author suggests that secessions are also driven by political parties who are willing to downsize their state rather than modify the existing regime, and by nationalists who calculate that they are unlikely to have political pivotality in a federal democracy. One implication is that federal power-sharing bargains have a better chance of working in deeply divided places when potential secessionists believe that they may have political pivotality within a federation.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
117134
|
|
|