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ID: 169153

Dilemma of the axis of evil: the rise and fall of Iran–DPRK relations / Choi, Lyong; Shin, Jong-dae ; Lee, Han-hyung

Choi, Lyong	Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract

This research examines the international relations between North Korea (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or DPRK) and Iran in the context of their shared perception of a threat from the United States. We discuss the conventional idea of the international relationship—the enemy of my enemy is my ally—to explain Pyongyang–Tehran relations, evaluate its past and current relations, and offer policy suggestions for the recent denuclearization approach toward North Korea and Iran. Using newly discovered archival resources and political records, we challenge the conventional idea that the two states share the same threat perception in a consistent manner and suggest the level of their military cooperation changes depending on the approach from Washington and the international community. This research provides a more exact picture of the international relations North Korea and Iran since the 1980s and of the link between their shared threat perception and denuclearization debates.

Key Words

Iran ; Persian Gulf ; Middle East ; Axis of Evil ; US Foreign Policy ; North Korean Nuclear Crisis ;
Iran – Iraq War ; JCPOA ; North Kore

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ID: 115098

Shoring up Iraq, 1983 to 1990: Washington and the chemical weapons controversy / Fredman, Zach

Fredman, Zach	Journal Article
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2012.

Summary/Abstract

President Ronald Reagan's White House leaned toward Baghdad during the Iran-Iraq War because it sought to prevent an Iraqi defeat. Though the White House deemed Iraqi chemical weapons use abhorrent, it found the implications of an Iranian victory or expanded Soviet influence in the Middle East far more alarming. Newly released documents from the Iraqi state archives now allow an exploration of the chemical weapons controversy from both Iraqi and American perspectives. This evidence, along with sources from American archives, demonstrates that Washington and Baghdad had radically different assessments of the Iran-Iraq War. American officials hoped to mould Iraq into a useful ally, but Saddam interpreted American support as subterfuge. Saddam's hostile view of American intentions indicates that Washington had less influence over Iraqi behaviour during the 1980s than both contemporary American officials and many scholars writing since have realised. To insist that Washington could have deterred Iraqi chemical weapons use overstates American clout.

Key Words

Ronald Reagan ; Iran - Iraq War ; Baghdad ; White House ; Iraqi Chemical Weapons ; Iran – Iraq War

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