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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
115099
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The release of the only man convicted of the bombing of Pan-Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in December 1988 is the most significant diplomatic decision taken by the Scottish government. The decision constituted a two-level process: the British government's behaviour was characterised by commercial interests; and the Scottish governments by calculated compassion. Britain's policy was steered by its national interest in securing Libya's rehabilitation into international society and ensuring that British businesses could benefit. Scotland's paradiplomacy shifted from a strategy of avoidance to one using the release to further the idea of an independent Scotland. Presenting the release in such a way was to bolster the idea of Scotland as a distinct entity with its own set of values, laws, and customs and possessing an ability to operate autonomously on the international stage.
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| 2 |
ID:
169989
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British colonial rule in Nyasaland (present-day Malawi), from 1891 to 1966, occurred alongside various businesses owned by British nationals. This article uses the case of the British South Africa Company (BSAC), which fell into the “export production business” category. Departing from earlier studies that emphasize the active and influential role of British businesses in the decolonization process, this study argues to the contrary, and does so by using archival materials, to analyze the history of the company’s involvement in the Protectorate’s economy, before analyzing three main reasons for its decolonization the year that Nyasaland attained its republican status in 1966. The reasons include that the company was not operational having decided not to invest its resources in the Protectorate; the desire by nationalist leaders to have a share in the business sector and to reward other local/African businessmen; and the policy direction of the newly independent administration to revoke dubious claims of land ownership of the colonial period, with a plan to boost the country’s agriculturally based economy to the benefit of the African majority. Nonetheless, as this article posits, most of the people were also disadvantaged by the land policies enacted by the post-colonial political elites. This reality denied them (the ordinary people) an immediate chance to enjoy the “fruits of independence.”
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| 3 |
ID:
118913
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Drawing principally upon a rich vein of previously unexploited business records, this paper analyses the experience of British firms in Indonesia between the achievement of independence and the beginnings of the Suharto regime. As in The Netherlands East Indies, British enterprises occupied a significant position in post-colonial Indonesia in plantations, oil extraction, shipping, banking, the import-export trade, and manufacturing. After the nationalization of Dutch businesses from the end of 1957, Britain emerged as the leading investing power in the archipelago alongside the United States. However, during Indonesia's Confrontation with British-backed Malaysia (1963-1966), most UK-owned companies in the islands were subject to a series of torrid (albeit temporary) takeovers by the trade unions and subsequently various government authorities. Most of these investments were returned to British ownership under Suharto after 1967. But, in surviving the Sukarno era, British firms had endured 15 years of increasing inconvenience and insecurity trapped in a power struggle within Indonesia's perplexing plural polity (and particularly between the Communist Party and the military). Indeed, the Konfrontasi takeovers themselves, varying in intensity from region to region and from firm to firm, were indicative of deep fissures within Indonesian administration and politics. The unpredictable and unsettled political economy of post-colonial Indonesia meant that the balance of advantage lay not with transnational enterprise but with the host state and society.
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