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ID: 184729

Bureaucratic Shirking in China: Is Sanction-based Accountability a Cure? / Tu, Wenyan; Gong, Ting

Gong, Ting	Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract

This study analyses the intricate relationship between sanction-based accountability and bureaucratic shirking. Drawing on an original survey conducted among Chinese civil servants, it addresses the question of whether sanction-based accountability can effectively regulate the conduct of public officials and provide a cure for bureaucratic shirking. The study identifies the characteristics of shirking behaviour in the Chinese bureaucracy and distinguishes three major patterns: evading responsibility, shifting responsibility and reframing responsibility. The findings indicate that sanction-based accountability may contain some obvious and notorious slacking types of behaviour, such as stalling and inaction, but government officials may distort or reframe their responsibilities to cope with accountability pressure. Empirical evidence suggests that owing to some “strategic” adjustments in bureaucratic behaviour, flagrant shirking is replaced by more subtle ways of blame avoidance, such as playing it safe or fabricating performance information. Sanction-based accountability therefore does not offer a panacea for bureaucratic shirking.

Key Words

China ; Corruption ; Accountability ; Civil Servants ; Shirking ; Bureaucratic Behaviour

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ID: 115268

Toward a theory of civil–military punishment / Bessner, Daniel; Lorber, Eric

Bessner, Daniel	Journal Article
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2012.

Summary/Abstract

This article addresses a significant question in American civil-military relations: under what conditions will civilian principals punish military leaders for shirking? In order to inductively derive a theory of civil-military punishment, the authors examine two cases of military shirking where there is little doubt that insubordination occurred. The first case the authors analyze is Douglas MacArthur's insubordination under Harry Truman during the Korean War, and the second is Colin Powell's scuttling of Bill Clinton's plan to allow homosexuals to serve openly in the military in late 1992 and early 1993. This analysis indicates that two factors are linked to civil-military punishment. First, the salience of the issue at stake determines whether he or she decides to punish shirking. The second factor linked to punishment is whether or not the civilian has the military's support to pursue punishment.

Key Words

Civil - Military Relations ; Macarthur ; Civil – Military Relations ; Shirking ; Feaver ; Powell

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