Query Result Set
SLIM21 Home
Advanced Search
My Info
Browse
Arrivals
Expected
Reference Items
Journal List
Proposals
Media List
Rules
ActiveUsers:1184
Hits:19504164
Show My Basket
Contact Us
IDSA Web Site
Ask Us
Today's News
Help
Topics
Tutorial
Advanced search
Hide Options
Sort Order
Natural
Author / Creator, Title
Title
Item Type, Author / Creator, Title
Item Type, Title
Subject, Item Type, Author / Creator, Title
Item Type, Subject, Author / Creator, Title
Publication Date, Title
Items / Page
5
10
15
20
Modern View
MEHLUM, HALVOR
(2)
answer(s).
Srl
Item
1
ID:
115303
Case for open access publishing
/ Mehlum, Halvor
Mehlum, Halvor
Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication
2012.
Summary/Abstract
This article presents some of the main efficiency and fairness arguments in favor of open access publishing. It discusses how general open access could affect research and editorial practice. It ends with a discussion of the feasibility of open access and how a move to open access publishing could happen.
Key Words
Efficiency
;
Feasibility
;
Article
;
Open Access Publishing
In Basket
Export
2
ID:
187557
Self-enforcing dynamics of crime and protection
/ Kløve, Eva ; Mehlum, Halvor
Mehlum, Halvor
Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Summary/Abstract
This article presents a model describing a symbiotic relationship between criminals and a partnership of protection providers, called the Firm. The partners of the Firm earn profits as they have market power in the supply of protection. The Firm recruits its new partners among criminals. As a result, the prospect of graduating to the Firm adds an incentive for violent crime. The result is a violence multiplier where more violence increases the profits to the partners of the Firm, in turn contributing to the incentive for violence. The violence multiplier also generates an incentive for the protection providers to welcome new partners, even though new partners dilute the profits. The model combines elements from contest theory and rent-seeking theory but, nevertheless, generates results that are in contrast to standard results from the rent-seeking literature. For example, due to the interdependence between protection providers and criminals, a decrease in the cost of violence increases violence more than pari passu and increases the value of being a criminal. Also, tougher competition between criminals may benefit all of them. The empirical relevance of key elements of this framework are confirmed by exploring unique data on incarcerated youth in South Africa. The empirical results confirm a hierarchical gang structure and indicate that this structure does indeed promote violence.
Key Words
Violence
;
organized crime
;
South Africa
;
Gangs
;
Stationary Bandits
;
Youth Offenders
Links
'Full Text'
In Basket
Export