Query Result Set
Skip Navigation Links
   ActiveUsers:772Hits:20009332Skip Navigation Links
Show My Basket
Contact Us
IDSA Web Site
Ask Us
Today's News
HelpExpand Help
Advanced search
  Hide Options
Sort Order Items / Page
NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL TREATIES (2) answer(s).
 
SrlItem
1
ID:   142264


Nuclear warhead verification: a review of attribute and template systems / Yan, Jie; Glaser, Alexander   Article
Glaser, Alexander Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Summary/Abstract Verification of current nuclear arms control treaties between United States and Russia relies primarily on the verification of delivery vehicles. Warheads are counted indirectly via the delivery vehicles that they are associated with. As states move to lower numbers of nuclear weapons in their arsenals, verification will likely pose complex challenges. Most importantly, future nuclear disarmament treaties may place limits on the total number of nuclear weapons in the arsenals. Their verification would require inspections of individual nuclear warheads without revealing secret information. Confirming the authenticity of nuclear warheads and perhaps also of warhead components is at the center of the verification challenge for future reductions in the nuclear arsenals. This paper provides an overview of the development of verification systems, and highlights the challenges and the opportunities for future research in this area.
        Export Export
2
ID:   115341


Russian violations of its arms control obligations / Schneider, Mark B   Journal Article
Schneider, Mark B Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication 2012.
Summary/Abstract The Soviet Union and its successor state the Russian Federation have consistently violated their arms control obligations since the beginning of modern arms control in 1972. The violations have involved all major nuclear arms control treaties, including those that limit strategic and theater nuclear arms and constrain nuclear testing. This pattern of behavior is certain to continue. As a result, the nuclear warheads on the Russian missiles apparently will have been tested in contravention of a declared nuclear test moratorium and Russia's legal obligations concerning the CTBT. There is almost never any consequence for these violations. These violations have clear military significance, and they should have an impact upon our views of arms control. Regrettably, they do not. The evidence is more often suppressed than provided to the American people and we continue to ignore it in our arms control policy.
        Export Export