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| 1 |
ID:
057303
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| 2 |
ID:
109887
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| 3 |
ID:
054630
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Lahore, Mashal, 2004.
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 048871 | 303.625/RAN 048871 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 4 |
ID:
107977
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article looks at the growth and evolution of the The Abdullah Azzam Brigades, from the group's Egyptian origins through its most recent attack on a Japanese tanker in the Hormuz Straits. In addition to an overview of the group's main personalities and claims of responsibility, the article aims to explain the group by placing it in the context of recent jihadi theory.
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| 5 |
ID:
078443
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| 6 |
ID:
154705
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article seeks to determine the correlates of Lebanese Muslims perceptions of the Islamic State (ISIS) which are measured using the hypotheses that commitment to political Islam, young age, education and occupational status would predict approval of ISIS. In view of the accentuated polarisation between Sunnis and Shiis along sectarian lines, it is proposed that dislike for the Shiis would enhance the level of support for ISIS. The study was based on a cross-sectional survey Lebanese Muslims (N = 302) administered during the fall of 2015.The suggestion is that adherence to the tenets of political Islam, sectarianism and educational attainment are major predictors of endorsement for ISIS.
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| 7 |
ID:
134170
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In 1989 the Soviet Union withdrew its forces from Afghanistan leaving the embattled Afghan Communist government of President Mohammad Najibullah to fight against an emboldened mujahideen insurgency. Most experts expected a quick mujahideen victory once the Soviets were no longer directly involved in counterinsurgency operations in support of the Afghan government. But in the spring of 1989 the Afghan Communists beat the odds and defeated a mujahideen rebel offensive designed to capture the eastern city of Jalalabad. This proved to be a turning point, and for the next three years the Najibullah regime held out against the mujahideen 'freedom fighters'. In fact the Afghan Communist regime actually outlasted its sponsor the Soviet Union. The reasons for this remarkable achievement can be traced, in part, to ethnic-tribal divisions among the quarreling mujahideen parties and the Afghan government's ability to exploit them. This largely untold story has obvious implications for understanding the future of post-Karzai Afghanistan, tribalism, ethnicity, and foreign sponsorship in post-US Afghanistan. This article will explore the reasons for the resilience of the Najibullah Communist government and then assess possible implications for a post-2014 Afghan government.
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| 8 |
ID:
021800
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| Publication |
Jan-July 2001.
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| Description |
79-94
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| 9 |
ID:
050210
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New York, Random House, 2002.
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| Description |
xvii, 490p.
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| Standard Number |
0375508597
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 046777 | 303.6250973/BEN 046777 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 10 |
ID:
062238
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Jul-Aug 2005.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Al Qaeda and its affiliated groups offer the analyst a highly complex challenge. The current literature classifies Islamic terrorist organizations as either networked or hierarchical. Yet, this classification fails to account for the appearance on the international stage of a new type of global terrorism. Most notably, it does not capture the structure and mode of operation of Al Qaeda as it emerged after the 2001 U.S.-led assault on Afghanistan. This article therefore introduces a new conceptthe Dune organizationthat is distinct from other organizational modes of thinking. This conceptualization leads to a new typology of Islamic terrorist organizations. This typology concentrates on organizational behavior patterns and provides a framework for a comparative analysis of terrorist movements, which is applied to a study of Al Qaeda, Hizballah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
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| 11 |
ID:
068553
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Viva Books, 2006.
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| Description |
403p.
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| Standard Number |
8130903733
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 051069 | 320.557094/VID 051069 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 12 |
ID:
083324
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| Publication |
Cambridge, Belknap Press, 2008.
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| Description |
xiv, 363p.
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| Standard Number |
9780674028043
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 053835 | 363.325/KEP 053835 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 13 |
ID:
080351
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| Publication |
New York, Double Day, 2007.
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| Description |
xxxii, 318p.
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| Standard Number |
9780385516556
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 053098 | 363.325/IBR 053098 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 14 |
ID:
060835
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| Publication |
Jan-Feb 2005.
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| Summary/Abstract |
At first glance, Kenya and Tanzania, the scene of some of Al Qaida's most impressive attacks, would appear to be fertile ground for recruiting militants into the global Islamist jihad. Substantial Muslim populations, widespread poverty, poor policing, inadequate border control, and systemic political and economic corruption would seem to make these East African countries potentially rich environments in which to attract new Al Qaida members. However, other factors essential to the terrorist recruitment process are largely absent. Despite claims that the traditionally tolerant Muslim populations of Kenya and Tanzania re being radicalized, the evidence suggests that Islamist radicals have in fact made little headway. Although individuals may have forged links with Al Qaida, Osama bin Laden and his network have few followers. Of course, this is subject to change. But in the near term, absent an environment of radicalism, as in a major recruitment ground like Pakistan, it is difficult to see how Al Qaida can expect to attract more than a handful of new members. That said, the United States could do far more in the region to prevent the emergence of violent Islamist extremism.
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| 15 |
ID:
172168
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| Summary/Abstract |
On June 29, 2014, the Islamic State emerged and declared the establishment of its caliphate. The declaration was a direct challenge to other Sunni Jihadi groups including Al Qaeda and an attempt to become the leading Jihadi group around. The rivalry that evolved within Sunni Jihadism, and particularly between Al Qaeda and its renegade affiliate the Islamic State, entailed a hitherto unseen competitive environment within the Jihadi field. Interestingly, the increased competition did not lead to a dynamic of competitive escalation and mutual radicalization of behaviour. Theory tells us to expect competitive escalation, or outbidding, in such contexts, but despite the initial success of the Islamic State’s brutality and offensive conquest in Syria and Iraq, Al Qaeda did not “play along” and instead pursued a different path. The reason for this absence of competitive escalation, this paper argues, is to be found in a pre-conflict methodological re-orientation within Al Qaeda and in the pacifying role played by influential Al Qaeda-affiliated ideologues.
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| 16 |
ID:
132511
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Barack Obama administration's May 2013 assessment of al Qaeda's weakness and fracturing in the post-bin Laden era has been greeted with indignation by both liberals and conservatives. They believe al Qaeda is stronger than ever in the wake of the Arab Spring. These critics, however, misunderstand the network's dysfunctional direction. Al Qaeda's "resurgence" is likely to lead to its failure. The argument proceeds on four levels: (1) the dramatic growth of the al Qaeda network masks its internal weakness and organizational splintering; (2) the Arab Spring has led to a burst of al Qaeda activism that is likely to undermine its jihadist cause; (3) al Qaeda's fragmentation and its multiple trajectories in the post-9/ 11 era violate bin Laden's original intent and are beyond al Qaeda Central's direction; and (4) the dysfunctional nature of al Qaeda's ideology and its excessive reliance on takfiri violence is paradoxically a source of both persistence and failure.
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| 17 |
ID:
097156
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Al Qaida and its jihadist allies shape their plans and operations substantially in response to threats they face from authoritarian intelligence services of the Middle East. While most jihadists initially believed that victory over their 'near enemies'- so-called 'apostate' regimes - should be their top priority, the ruthlessly effective security apparatuses of their home countries were significant factors in the transition to 'global jihadism', which emphasized the fight against the 'far enemy': the United States. This article presents al Qaida's views of the region's domestic intelligence services by examining captured documents and open source materials.
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| 18 |
ID:
068196
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| 19 |
ID:
055050
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| 20 |
ID:
086852
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The fight Al-Qa'ida has waged against the West has been fought on a virtual as well as physical battlefield. Recently, many jihadist strongholds and hiding places on the web have been shut down. This article charts the growth and the current crisis of Al-Qa'ida's 'media jihad'.1
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