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| 1 |
ID:
076534
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| 2 |
ID:
189247
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explores the prospect of transforming the Philippine-U.S. alliance into a security partnership. In the past, the Philippines doubted the U.S.’s often-repeated commitment to assist its ally because the 1951 Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defence Treaty (MDT) merely stipulated consultation rather than an automatic armed response in case of an armed conflict. In mid-2011, the Aquino Administration asked for an unequivocal U.S. guarantee to defend the Philippines and its naval/air units deployed in the Spratlys. The Duterte Administration, however, has expressed its uncertainty over America’s willingness to back the Philippines militarily in any confrontation with China over the disputed maritime territory. Early this year, President Rodrigo Duterte commented that an armed clash in the South China Sea would crush the Philippines because the involvement of American forces would make the conflict spiral out of control. This development, along with his decision to abrogate the 1997 Philippine-U.S. Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), has generated a crisis in the alliance. To avert any break-down in their overall security relations, the two allies can explore the possibility of downgrading their alliance to a security partnership. In conclusion, the article argues that should the Philippines consider this option, it must take into account the following: the consequence of losing the deterrence effect of a defence treaty with the world’s most powerful nation; the impact on Philippine defence spending; on the ongoing Armed Forces of the Philippines’ (AFP’s) modernisation program; and whether or not the Filipino nation will support this move.
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| 3 |
ID:
053824
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| 4 |
ID:
159425
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article argues that the creation of ‘strategic partnerships’ as an alternative form of alignment represents an effort by Tokyo, and other US-allies, to ‘decenter’ their respective security policies from their erstwhile over-dependence on Washington. By examining the nature, purpose, and dynamics of strategic partnerships more closely, and investigating the empirical case of Australia, we can gain a greater appreciation of their significance both to Japan's evolving security policy and the broader role they play in the Asia Pacific security landscape. The article argues that Australia has been the most significant and successful of Japan's new strategic partnerships to date, has therefore come to represent the template for other new alignments, and hence provides a yardstick against which their effectiveness can be measured. It concludes that while the strategic partnership certainly represents a new departure for Japanese security policy – ostensibly independent of the US-alliance – closer inspection reveals how this relationship remains fundamentally bound to the broader American-hub-and-spokes system.
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| 5 |
ID:
071832
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2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Over the last year, the U.S. and Indian governments struck a deal that recognizes India as a nuclear weapons power. Critics say Washington gave up too much too soon and at a great cost to nonproliferation efforts. Perhaps. But India could in time become a valuable security partner. So despite the deal's flaws and the uncertainties surrounding its implementation, Washington should move forward with it.
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| 6 |
ID:
079083
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2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The rise of a democratic and increasingly powerful India is a positive development for U.S. interests. Rarely has the United States shared so many interests and values with a growing power as we do today with India. By reaching out to India, we have made the bet that the future lies in pluralism, democracy, and market economics
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| 7 |
ID:
062197
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| Publication |
Spring/Summer 2005.
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| 8 |
ID:
068123
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| 9 |
ID:
127740
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Research and Information System for Developing Countries, 2013.
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| Description |
xvi, 266p.Pbk
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| Contents |
Proceedings of the first round table on ASEAN-India network of think-tanks (AINTT), 7-8August 2012, New Delhi
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| Standard Number |
81-7122-101-7
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 057575 | 327.59054/IND 057575 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 10 |
ID:
139716
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| Summary/Abstract |
Nyunt Maung Shein notes New Zealand’s improved relations with Myanmar and proposals to upgrade its ties with ASEAN to a strategic partnership.
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| 11 |
ID:
067499
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| 12 |
ID:
162451
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| Summary/Abstract |
It is always a risky affair, especially for a weak state to strike the right balance while
dealing with two great powers having serious conflicting interests in a particular
region. For a country like Pakistan which remains dependent on foreign aid, running
an independent foreign policy seems quite difficult. While Pakistan’s relations with
China continued to remain smooth throughout history, its relations with the United
States has been more of a roller coaster than a smooth ride but still both could never
be too apart from each other because of various compelling reasons. Currently,
China and Pakistan are extensively engaged in promoting their mutual economic
and strategic interests that go against the U.S. interests. Therefore, in the case of a
possible conflict between United States and China, Pakistan might be trapped in
a catch-22 because it cannot afford to infuriate the United States beyond certain
limits. In such a trap, staying neutral might be even riskier. Slow and steady change
in the status of Gilgit–Baltistan beyond a certain level for promotion of the China–
Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) would also be a serious trap. Pakistan could
afford to lose economic benefits of the CPEC but it cannot afford to give up its
claim over Kashmir which remains the “lifeline” for its survival. Pakistani Generals
fighting on exterior fronts must therefore, make smart moves to ensure that at no
stage should Islamabad be compelled to put all its eggs in one basket.
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| 13 |
ID:
062508
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| Publication |
Jul 16, 2005.
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| 14 |
ID:
159612
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| Summary/Abstract |
The growing weight of China in terms of power and influence, defined either as a pole of attraction or as a pole of opposition, shapes the strategic environment of the Asia Pacific as well as the South Asian region. China has taken up its One Belt, One Road (OBOR) project, which is aimed at building trade and infrastructure network and ensuring access to trade and energy passage. It is both a development and diplomatic project for China focused on creating an economic and political sphere of influence not only in the region but also in the global context. Most countries in South Asia are engaged with this OBOR initiative. In this backdrop, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Bangladesh in October 2016. During the visit, Bangladesh joined the OBOR initiative and both the countries pledged to upgrade their relations from the existing ‘closer comprehensive partnership’ to ‘strategic partnership’. In this respect, the main objectives of this paper are to understand the strategic partnership in the context of Bangladesh-China relations, to identify the factors shaping Bangladesh-China strategic partnership and to explore the implications of this partnership for both Bangladesh and China. The paper also elucidates its regional ramifications.
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| 15 |
ID:
161079
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| Summary/Abstract |
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS between Brazil and Russia, which were established on October 3, 1828, reached the level of strategic partnership in 2002. In 2010, the Russian Federation and Brazil adopted a strategic cooperation plan of action, outlining an array of bilateral goals and tasks to deepen dialogue between various institutions in a bilateral format, within the framework of BRICS, and in a multilateral format.
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| 16 |
ID:
074847
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| 17 |
ID:
167810
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper explores the evolution of the policy agenda of the EU-South Korea strategic partnership, based on key pillars of cooperation: politics, security, and economics. In the political arena, the Framework Agreement has provided a major platform for promoting EU-Korea political dialogue and developing a common stance toward a shared global agenda. When it comes to security, the main agenda involves North Korea’s missiles, nuclear program, and the challenge of nonproliferation; the two parties have coordinated sanctions against North Korea. South Korea has enacted a Crisis Management Participation Agreement (FPA) with the EU and begun to participate in the EU common security and defence policy. The changing security environment on the Korean Peninsula, as a consequence of recent inter-Korean and US-North Korea dialogues, may offer the EU new opportunities for constructive engagement. In the economic arena, the EU-Korea FTA has established solid trade and investment relations. While these pillars of the strategic partnership have led to stable and mature bilateral relations, both the EU and South Korea need to find new momentum for an enhanced partnership to deal with the ongoing challenge of global security instability and the backlash against the liberal international order. The EU-South Korea strategic partnership also needs a global agenda that covers climate change, technology, education, and culture. This study assesses the development of each pillar of the strategic partnership, addressing key challenges, tasks, and future diplomatic developments between the EU and South Korea.
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| 18 |
ID:
077519
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| 19 |
ID:
079136
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The disintegration of the USSR and the formation of the Russian Federation as an independent state have been the starting point of shaping and developing the present-day Russian-Chinese relations. This process has been going on for fifteen years according to its own logic and is largely determined by the modern national-state interests of Russia and China, as well as their place in the international division of labour and their geopolitical position. At the same time many important specific features of the modern Russian-Chinese relations can be adequately understood only in the context of the preceding intensive interaction of the two countries, whose history goes back about four hundred years
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| 20 |
ID:
151866
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