|
|
|
Sort Order |
|
|
|
Items / Page
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
153602
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Does the International Criminal Court's (ICC) pursuit of justice facilitate peace or prolong conflict? This paper addresses the “peace versus justice” debate by examining the ICC's impact on civil conflict termination. Active ICC involvement in a conflict increases the threat of punishment for rebel and state leaders, which, under certain conditions, generates incentives for these leaders to continue the conflict as a way to avoid capture, transfer to the Hague, and prosecution. The impact of ICC involvement is conditional upon the threat of domestic punishment that leaders face; as the risk of domestic punishment increases, the conflict-prolonging effects of ICC involvement diminish. I test these theoretical expectations on a data set of all civil conflict dyads from 2002 to 2013. Findings support the hypothesized relationship. Even after addressing potential selection and endogeneity concerns, I find that active involvement by the ICC significantly decreases the likelihood of conflict termination when the threat of domestic punishment is relatively low.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
157728
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998 marked a substantial advance in the effort to ensure all perpetrators of mass atrocities can be brought to justice. Yet significant resistance to the anti-impunity norm, and the ICC as the implementing institution, has arisen in Africa. The ICC has primarily operated in Africa, and since it sought to indict the sitting Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in 2008 resistance from both individual African states and the African Union has increased substantially. We draw on the concept of ‘norm antipreneurs’, and the broader norm dynamics literature, to analyse how resistance has developed and manifested itself, as well as the potential effects of this resistance on the anti-impunity norm. We conclude that the antipreneur concept helped us structure and organise analysis of the case – suggesting it could be usefully deployed in other similar cases – but that this case also suggests that antipreneurs do not always enjoy substantial defensive advantages. We also conclude that African resistance to the ICC has substantially stalled the advance of the anti-impunity norm, a finding that has significant implications for the wider effort to reduce mass atrocity crimes in the contemporary era.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
148465
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
In October 2016, South Africa became the first nation to withdraw from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), after Burundi began taking steps to leave it. Kenya is likely to follow, and other states, like Uganda, could take the same cue. The ICC is facing the most serious diplomatic crisis of its history, with the African Union (AU) denouncing double standards, neo-colonialism and ‘white justice’, and regularly threatening to withdraw from the Rome Statute en masse. This article adopts both an interdisciplinary and a pragmatic policy-oriented approach, with the aim of producing concrete recommendations to counteract the crisis. It firstly outlines the context of this crisis which, although not new, is becoming increasingly serious. It then responds to the AU's objections to the ICC. The court's ‘Afro-centrism’ is explained by objective facts (the occurrence of mass crimes taking place on the African continent, the large number of African parties to the Rome Statute, the principle of complementarity) as well as by subjective decisions (a convergence of interest between the African leaders who brought the cases to the court themselves to weaken their opponents, and the prosecutor who needed quickly to find cases). Afro-centrism should also be nuanced, as the ICC has already shown an interest in cases outside Africa and the extent to which it is a problem is a matter of perspective. The article also responds to the ‘peace vs justice’ objection, and emphasises that African states were instrumental in creating and sustaining the ICC. It finally formulates recommendations to ease relations between the ICC and AU, such as to investigate more outside Africa, reinforce African national jurisdictions, create intermediary institutional structures, promote regional-level action, and rely more on ICC-friendly African states and African civil society.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
121425
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2013.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The literature on transnational advocacy focuses on the battle for norm adoption, yet little is known about what happens to advocacy organizations after they succeed. Do they disband, take up another cause, or expand their mission? This article explores the organizational response of mission expansion through a case study of the Coalition for the International Criminal Court. The CICC-a prominent global coalition of local and international nongovernmental organizations-was instrumental in advocating for the formation and ratification of the Rome Statute, the treaty that created the International Criminal Court. Following the entry into force of the Rome Statute, the CICC did not disband or shift issues, but instead expanded its advocacy efforts and began service provision on behalf of the ICC.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
177736
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This paper contends that despite it functioning as a catalyst, the ICC “Africa problem” did not start with the arrest warrant against al-Bashir. To fully comprehend the current legitimacy crisis we must understand the nature of the negotiation process that led to the adoption of the Rome Statute and its enduring impact. In particular, we must acknowledge the uneven ability of states to formulate and signify their preferences on the basis of their identity and interests during the negotiation process. Drawing from Wiener’s theory of contestation, the paper contends that the absence of meaningful engagement with issues germane to some ICC stakeholders before and during the Rome Conference facilitated the adoption of the Rome Statute, but also plausibly created difficulties for the Court in the long run. Specifically, it postponed unavoidable conflict over contentious issues and undermined the likelihood that specific stakeholders would develop a sense of ownership over the Statute.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 6 |
ID:
175109
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
In recent years, the position of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in Africa has become an issue of contention. Through the African Union (AU), African leaders have expressed their concern in relation to the principle of impunity and self-sovereignty of African nations. The AU asserts fiercely that the influence of the ICC is overwhelming on the African continent; therefore, African leaders clamor for an amendment to the court or even a total withdrawal. I argue that the change of relationship initiated by the AU is not only selfish but also unequivocally harmful to the tenets of justice, law and order. By way of a vast exploration of data (internet sources, official government records, print sources and online interviews), this study reiterates the importance of the anti-impunity norm of the ICC as an instrument of equity, especially when African leaders are involved.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 7 |
ID:
190047
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Under the headings of promoting human rights and international law, the influential network of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) has been a central actor in the political war targeting Israel though allegations of apartheid and racism. In applying these slanders, the NGOs systematically erase the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, including decades of warfare and terrorism, and join in the attempt to delegitimize the nation-state of the Jewish people, regardless of borders, and as distinct from criticism of Israeli policies regarding territory occupied in the 1967 war. This process constitutes the essence of post-Holocaust or ‘new antisemitism’, as included in the consensus working definition published by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance. The NGO campaigns are constructed on the foundations established by the Soviet and Islamic blocs culminating in the 1975 UN ‘Zionism is racism’ resolution. This theme was revived in the NGO Forum of the 2001 Durban Conference, led by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and Palestinian groups such as Al-Haq, and used to justify appropriating the methods of the South African anti-apartheid campaign, including boycotts and lawfare. After the Durban conference and for 20 years since, this NGO network continued and expanded the campaign based on the apartheid and racism allegations. Their claims were amplified in media platforms, international bodies, anti-Israel church groups and on university campuses in the form of ‘Israel apartheid weeks’. European governments enabled activities of the Palestinian and Israeli NGOs through substantial funding, estimated at 120 million Euros annually. In 2020 and 2021, the NGO emphasis on these themes increased, led by HRW, and supporting the decision of the ICC prosecutor to accept jurisdiction over Palestinian claims and to open investigations against Israel. This context amplified the potency of the allegations of apartheid and racism in attempts to demonise Israel.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 8 |
ID:
139581
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Recent studies have highlighted the instrumental use of language, wherein actors deploy claims to strategically pursue policy goals in the absence of persuasion or socialisation. Yet these accounts are insufficiently attentive to the social context in which an audience assesses and responds to strategic appeals. I present a theoretical account that highlights the distinctly powerful role of international law in framing strategic argumentation. Legalised discourses are especially legitimate because law is premised on a set of internally coherent practices that constitute actors and forms of action. I then illustrate the implications in a hard case concerning US efforts to secure immunities from International Criminal Court jurisdiction. Contrary to realist accounts of law as a tool of the powerful, I show that both pro- and anti-ICC diplomacy was channelled through a legal lens that imposed substantial constraints on the pursuit of policy objectives. Court proponents responded to US diplomatic pressure with their own legal arguments; this narrowed the scope of the exemptions, even as the Security Council temporarily conceded to US demands. While the US sought to marry coercion with argumentative appeals, it failed to generate a lasting change in global practice concerning ICC jurisdiction.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 9 |
ID:
055787
|
|
|
| 10 |
ID:
117857
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2012.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The role of small states has been largely neglected in research on the process and outcome of multilateral negotiations. Even though these states may be active in the agenda-setting processes or display a specific engagement in certain thematic aspects of negotiations, in the end game the outcome of negotiations has been perceived to be dependent on the bargaining between major powers. However, small states also have strategies at their disposal to compensate for these weaknesses. Two principal ones come to mind, prioritization or niche diplomacy, and coalition-building to join forces with like-minded states in order to draw on their resources, expertise and manpower. In the article, we compare two cases of small state coalitions in multilateral negotiations, namely the Like Minded (LM) group in the negotiations that led to the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) in United Nations climate negotiations. While the two coalitions resort to similar strategies, they have not been comparably successful. We will show that the ability to translate discursive power into measurable effects on outcomes ultimately depends on the institutional setting of the negotiations and the nature of the issue that coalitions are tackling.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 11 |
ID:
055029
|
|
|
| 12 |
ID:
090743
|
|
|
| 13 |
ID:
147702
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm asserts that states have duties beyond their borders to help avoid, respond to, and prevent recurrence of circumstances that produce massive human rights violations. Actions undertaken to implement those duties can include aid, reform, or more muscular involvements. The need for such engagement implies that the target state’s government is losing or has lost its legitimacy. Labeling by the International Criminal Court (ICC) of a conflict as a ‘situation’ under its purview asserts that large-scale crimes are likely taking place for which individuals should be held accountable. This should trigger R2P considerations. However, the fit between R2P and the ICC is uncomfortable. Although the ICC may appear a useful tool for R2P, forays into the politics of R2P by the ICC are undertaken at its peril. Moreover, so far, the ICC has not clearly had positive effects upon conflict. While the ICC can be idealized as a contributor to R2P, coordination is formally non-existent and the Court’s protection effects are ambiguous.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 14 |
ID:
147547
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Whether and how violence can be controlled to spare innocent lives is a central issue in international relations. The most ambitious effort to date has been the International Criminal Court (ICC), designed to enhance security and safety by preventing egregious human rights abuses and deterring international crimes. We offer the first systematic assessment of the ICC's deterrent effects for both state and nonstate actors. Although no institution can deter all actors, the ICC can deter some governments and those rebel groups that seek legitimacy. We find support for this conditional impact of the ICC cross-nationally. Our work has implications for the study of international relations and institutions, and supports the violence-reducing role of pursuing justice in international affairs.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 15 |
ID:
116550
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2012.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The law on the enlistment, conscription or use of children under the age of 15 to participate actively in hostilities has been addressed in the jurisprudence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and in the first judgment of the International Criminal Court in the case of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. This article examines the parameters of the international criminal law relating to child soldiers, focusing on the conduct element of the three modes of committing a child-soldier-related offence. Two main issues are addressed: whether Articles 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 8(2)(e)(vii) of the 1998 Rome Statute describe two or three separate categories of conduct and whether sexual violence may constitute a form of use in hostilities. These issues are discussed within the framework of the prior evolution of the law and the unfolding practice of the International Criminal Court.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 16 |
ID:
170413
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article explores the Chinese policies towards the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the context of global governance. Despite China’s fast-growing foreign policy competence, the level of confidence held by China in engaging with global governance systems has not yet fully transmitted to the legal institutions governing human rights issues, and the ICC is such an example. This article examines specific policy concerns of China regarding the ICC in light of China’s engagement with global governance, and some of the traditional concerns that have had an impact on that engagement. It discusses the extent to which these concerns should still be regarded as policy barriers preventing China’s full accession to the ICC in years to come.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 17 |
ID:
141456
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article uses a hard law—the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court—to examine the depth of China's socialization in the international human rights regime and the relative weights of sovereignty and human rights norms in determining China's policy choices. It shows that the reasons for China's rejection of the Rome Statute are twofold. On the one hand, Chinese leaders have not fully internalized human rights norms, and they prioritize state sovereignty over human rights when making decisions. On the other hand, the legalized Rome Statute sets up an independent court with mandatory jurisdiction and grants the Prosecutor the ex officio right to investigate a crime. Such treaty provisions may have negative impacts on China's core sovereignty of territorial integration and regime security, thus imposing high sovereignty costs on China. Therefore, China resolutely voted against the Rome Statute, even if such an action made it a small minority outside the international mainstream. These findings indicate that China is still in a weak socialization stage and is not able to take on binding human rights and humanitarian obligations with high sovereignty costs.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 18 |
ID:
057304
|
|
|
| 19 |
ID:
170257
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
In this Issue we are excited to share with our readers four outstanding pieces that examine the ‘for’ and ‘against’ arguments on the recent International Criminal Court decision (September 2018) to investigate and prosecute crimes against humanity committed against the Rohingya people, who fled Myanmar into Bangladesh in late August 2017.
We have published two commentaries that are in favour of the ICC decision: Victoria Colvin and Phil Orchard, University of Wollongong; Melinda Rankin, University of Queensland, and Kip Hale, Atrocity Crimes Investigations. We have also published two commentaries that adopt a (nuanced) against position on the ICC decision: Douglas Guilfoyle, UNSW Canberra at Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA); Morten Pedersen, UNSW ADFA. These are outstanding pieces. We hope you enjoy reading them.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 20 |
ID:
073986
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2006.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Differences between American and European conceptions of a rule-governed international order can be observed via an examination of the legal regimes governing the conduct of American and British troops in Iraq. In principle, the US military authorities recognise the authority of international humanitarian law with respect to, for example, the treatment of prisoners and the distinction between combatants and non-combatants, but in other respects they are able to prosecute the war against the insurgency in a conventional way. British troops, on the other hand, are obliged to act in accordance with a much more restrictive legal regime, based on changes introduced subsequent to Britain's membership of the International Criminal Court. Under this regime, British military forces in Basra are subject to much the same kind of rules concerning the use of force that govern the operation of civilian police forces in Western Europe. This 'European' attempt to control the way in which force is used is widely seen as a positive move in the direction of minimising the role of force in international relations - but such a judgement is questionable since there may well be circumstances where the effective use of force is both necessary and justified.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|