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| 1 |
ID:
115754
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| 2 |
ID:
143307
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since 2002, NATO's territorial missile defense has evoked continuous debates between NATO states and the Russian Federation. Thirteen years have passed without reaching a common denominator. This article provides a comprehensive overview of the historical background of the debate and the technical details of the missile defense system, highlighting its shortcomings and the state of its deployment process. It also contrasts the military-technical and political arguments of both sides, before addressing the applicable norms of international law to highlight violations and the effect of this noncompliance on existing arms control measures.
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| 3 |
ID:
150283
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| Summary/Abstract |
In April 2009, barely three months into his first term, President Barack Obama warned the world that “if we believe that the spread of nuclear weapons is inevitable, then in some way we are admitting to ourselves that the use of nuclear weapons is inevitable.” These words and his pledge that “America will seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons” were delivered in Prague, and they will go down in history as some of his most memorable.
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| 4 |
ID:
170743
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The clock is ticking on an extension of the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). To complicate matters, instead of extending the treaty as is, Washington seeks to broaden the existing U.S.-Russian agreement by including China in a new trilateral arms control framework. There is no chance that Beijing would change its long-held views on arms control within the next 12 months before New START expires. Nonetheless, China’s growing military power and influence are producing counterpressures for China to deepen its participation in arms control. At a time when President Xi Jinping said China should “take center stage in the world,”1 China may find itself having to seriously prepare for major-power competitions and major-power arms control.
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| 5 |
ID:
150110
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| Summary/Abstract |
With rumblings that the Obama administration is considering an early extension to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, it is important to review the advantages and disadvantages to extending the treaty at this time. Moreover, in light of Russia's strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapon investments, as well as its broader, destabilizing foreign policy, there are plenty of reasons to delay. Conversely, the transparency the treaty provides and the strategic ceilings it institutes have a special value unto their own. Pursuing an extension now is not in the best interests of the United States, while examining other policy options is prudent.
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| 6 |
ID:
170744
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| Summary/Abstract |
Unless Russia and the United States choose to extend the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) for up to five years, the treaty is scheduled to expire in just one year. It represents the last vestige of the Cold War-created arms control foundations that have served to stabilize U.S.-Russian relations, and its collapse could create high levels of uncertainty and unpredictability. A complete collapse of these foundations, coupled with the deepening conflict between Russia and the West, could create a situation of high uncertainty and unpredictability.
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| 7 |
ID:
142387
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| Summary/Abstract |
President Barack Obama promised in the 2010 “Nuclear Posture Review [NPR] Report” that his administration would reduce the number, role, and salience of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense strategy. The “fundamental purpose” of the weapons, the review stated, is to deter nuclear attack, not wage a nuclear war. At the same time, the strategy called for maintaining and modernizing the remaining U.S. nuclear forces on a smaller triad of delivery systems.
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| 8 |
ID:
154181
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| Summary/Abstract |
Prospects for U.S.-Russian arms control look dim. Even extension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which is due to expire in February 2021, is in question. If the treaty reaches its end date with nothing to take its place, there will be no mutually agreed, verifiable limitations on strategic nuclear systems between the two countries whose arsenals make up more than 90 percent of the global total.
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| 9 |
ID:
156412
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| Summary/Abstract |
Prospects for U.S.-Russian arms control look dim. Even extension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which is due to expire in February 2021, is in question. If the treaty reaches its end date with nothing to take its place, there will be no mutually agreed, verifiable limitations on strategic nuclear systems between the two countries whose arsenals make up more than 90 percent of the global total.
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