| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Ellen Hillbom's contribution to the debate on the nature of the state in Botswana is most welcome.1 The relative success, despite important qualifiers, of Gaborone stands in stark contrast to many of its neighbours. Explaining this is important for studies of comparative African development. However, I disagree with Hillbom's negation of Botswana as a developmental state and her characterization of it as a gate-keeping state. Instead, I would argue that Botswana is an example of a state that has broadly pursued certain policies in the construction of a formative hegemony, to use Antonio Gramsci's concept.2 Doing so has led to what might be regarded as a developmental state to emerge - a state that pursues policies that coordinate investment plans; has a national development vision (implying that the state is an entrepreneurial agent); engages in institution building to promote growth and development; and, finally, plays a role in domestic conflict management.3 A key theorist of the developmental state, T. J. Pempel, indeed argues that 'These fusions of state and society are reflected in specific public policy profiles akin to what Antonio Gramsci called "hegemonic projects".'4
Six major components define the developmental state model: a determined developmental elite; relative autonomy; a powerful, competent and insulated bureaucracy; a weak and subordinated civil society; the effective management of non-state economic interests; and legitimacy and performance.5 Botswana's state since independence conforms to such indicators, managed by the Botswana Democrtaic Party (BDP).6 Its authoritarian nature alongside such features of its political economy is in keeping with 'typical' developmental states.7
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