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ID:
155795
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper examines the utility of the hegemonic stability theory in understanding regional power dynamics within Africa. The study operationalizes the concept of regional hegemony by drawing insights from a comparative foreign policy analysis of African regional powers, with emphasis on Nigeria. Using a largely qualitative methodology supplemented with primary data, the paper examines the underlying assertions of Nigeria’s perceived ‘hegemonic’ influence. Through the use of the hegemonic stability theory as a theoretical lens, this paper argues that Nigeria’s foreign policy shows few signs of a continental hegemonic disposition. In applying this theory at a regional level of analysis, the study finds very little empirical evidence that it fits the African regional context. In short, hegemonic claims in Africa are mere (un)official rhetoric and lack substance.
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| 2 |
ID:
124833
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
India's relationship with its neighbours in south Asia has been always influenced by domestic politics. Moreover, there has been a continuous fear psychosis amongst the smaller states of the area, which consider India a regional hegemon. India however needs to adopt the stance of an elder brother rather than a hegemon.
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| 3 |
ID:
174225
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Based on the fourth wave of the Asian Barometer Survey, I examine the contours and determinants of East Asians’ role model choices. The results show that pro-authoritarianism rule, recognition of China’s regional hegemon status, perception of China’s soft-power image, admiration for good governance, or inward-looking nationalism make East Asians more likely to choose an alternative role model rather than the USA. If the USA should loom out of East Asians’ vision for their country role model, the alternative role models would carry consequences in a potential shift in the democratic regime paradigm and a possible change in the political landscape in East Asia.
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| 4 |
ID:
145122
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| Summary/Abstract |
The European Union (EU) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) aspire to two different types of normative roles in their foreign relations, which reflect the different contexts and goals of their socialization frameworks. The EU, which can collectively count itself as a contemporary great power, seeks a normative role aiming to engage smaller players, often with serious domestic problems. By contrast, ASEAN—essentially a group of relatively weak states—is located in an area where its own security depends on the competition between great powers. Although the EU employs its normative power primarily to shape the political preferences of its neighboring small states and thus construct a normative hegemon in the European periphery, ASEAN’s normative influence is more concerned about intervention by the great powers of Asia. Although the EU model has dominated the discourse of normative power, the normative practice of ASEAN may be more relevant to the developing world facing great powers or a regional hegemon.
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| 5 |
ID:
116181
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
According to John Mearsheimer, the United States entered the First World War because the Wilson administration believed the Triple Entente was on the verge of defeat. As a result, he claims, the Americans entered the war to prevent Germany from becoming a regional hegemon in Europe. A careful and targeted examination of the relevant primary sources, however, demonstrates that Washington was largely unaware of the plight of the Allied powers in the spring of 1917; therefore, the argument that the United States was acting as an offshore balancer at this time is unconvincing. This article shows that unit-level factors and statecraft can play a larger role in international relations than structural realist theory allows and makes an empirical contribution to the World War I literature by demonstrating that balance of power considerations were not a major factor in the Wilson administration's decision for war.
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