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| 1 |
ID:
116184
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The purpose of this article is to outline and analyse David Ben-Gurion's security policy and alternatives to it offered by others and their role from the run up to the Six Day War of 1967 to this day. The differences are to be sought in Ben-Gurion's emphasis on deterrence, primarily nuclear deterrence, and on the American efforts to thwart this option, which contributed to his resignation in 1963; yet BG's security policy also entailed minimal territorial expansion in the West Bank as a result of renewed Arab aggression, while his successors adopted a preventive conventional war including territorial changes in the West Bank, East Jerusalem included. The ramifications of the Six Day War for the 1973 round of hostilities and for further conventional hostilities all the way to the shadow of the Iranian bomb are discussed.
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| 2 |
ID:
157204
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| Summary/Abstract |
Over the past decade or so, Pakistan has been focusing considerable energy and resources on the development of tactical nuclear weapons, most notably the Nasr short-range ballistic missile. This has been driven by the belief that India has a doctrine for rapid ground attacks into Pakistan, known as ‘Cold Start’, and that India’s capability to conduct such an operation is increasing. The strategic importance (and indeed the existence) of a Cold Start doctrine has been the subject of considerable debate; in reality, the Indian military has a wide range of options for military action against Pakistan, which probably include numerous options for ‘surgical strikes’ of varying degrees of military ambition and risk. Any Cold Start doctrine is likely seen by Delhi as an option of last resort.
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| 3 |
ID:
158014
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| Summary/Abstract |
The dominant narrative about Russia’s nuclear weapons in Western strategic literature since the beginning of the century has been something like this: Russia’s doctrine of ‘escalate to de-escalate’, and its large-scale military exercises, show that Moscow is getting ready to use low-yield, theatre nuclear weapons to stop NATO from defeating Russia’s forces, or to coerce the Atlantic Alliance and end a conflict on terms favourable to Russia.
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