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| 1 |
ID:
188754
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article argues for recognition of fringe fluidity as a distinct radicalization pathway. Most studies on individual-level radicalization examine how relatively normal people come to accept violent extremist beliefs. But some people who come to accept and act on an extremist ideology transition from the embrace of one form of violent extremism to another—and understanding their prior extremism is essential to appreciating their ultimate beliefs and actions. The article demonstrates the existence of fringe fluidity by detailing the pathway between neo-Nazism and militant Islamism. Factors allowing fringe fluidity between these ideologies include recent cases of individuals who transitioned from one to the other or simultaneously embraced both; some ideological overlap, particularly in shared out-groups; and historical precedent that allows some adherents to reconcile inconsistent aspects of the two ideologies. Despite this article’s focus on neo-Nazism and militant Islamism, fringe fluidity is likely more widely applicable beyond the context of these two ideologies.
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| 2 |
ID:
132366
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article is a detailed case study examining Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad (born Carlos Bledsoe), a lone wolf jihadist who carried out a fatal shooting at a joint Army-Navy recruiting center in Little Rock, Arkansas, on June 1, 2009. The article explores his early life, including involvement in violent and criminal activities that caused Muhammad to get into trouble with authorities, after which he decided to explore religion as an alternative that could keep him out of trouble. Muhammad found that he was attracted to the Islamic faith, and converted at the age of nineteen. The article explores Muhammad's subsequent turn toward Salafism, and chronicles his increasing extremism with reference to academic debates about the concept of radicalization and the role of religious ideas. Finally, the article explains Muhammad's attack on the recruiting center, and the manner in which he was able to continue his jihad even while imprisoned.
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| 3 |
ID:
116217
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article provides a detailed examination of how the Salafi-jihadi movement perceives the "Arab Spring" revolutionary events. Although Western scholars almost unanimously agree that these events will have an enormous impact on Al Qaeda and other groups that share its ideology, the voice of the jihadis has not been examined in detail. This article addresses this critical gap in the literature through an analysis of 101 significant documents produced by jihadi thinkers within a year following the movement's very first statement on the uprising in Tunisia. These include statements released by jihadi spokesmen, interviews with the movement's intellectual leaders, and discussions on jihadi Web forums. The article concludes that Al Qaeda and the jihadi movement largely believe that the uprisings provide them a great deal of new opportunities, and outlines the movement's developing strategy to capitalize on rapidly changing events on the ground.
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| 4 |
ID:
191520
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article investigates group fragmentation in the al-Qaeda and Islamic State ecosystems, employing network analysis to examine the impact of specific network conditions on the probability of a faction splitting. Using new datasets of faction–faction (FF) and terrorist–terrorist (TT) relationships, the article tests 18 hypotheses exploring connections between factional splits and the number, polarity, and strength of FF and TT relationships, among other factors. The article offers three major findings. First, a greater number of relationships between factions is positively correlated with the probability of fragmentation. Second, having a small or moderate number of a faction’s members belonging to another faction increases the probability of a split, but more significant cross-factional membership decreases the probability. Third, both high-degree centrality of a faction’s leader and significant variations in the degree centrality within a faction’s leadership structure is correlated with increased probability of a split.
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