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| 1 |
ID:
116235
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The contest-theoretic literature on the attack and defense of networks of targets focuses primarily on pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Hausken's 2008 European Journal of Operational Research article typifies this approach, and many of the models in this literature either build upon this model or utilize similar techniques. We show that Hausken's characterization of Nash equilibrium is invalid for much of the parameter space examined and provides necessary conditions for his solution to hold. The complete characterization of mixed-strategy equilibria remains an open problem, although there exist solutions in the literature for special prominent cases.
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| 2 |
ID:
116236
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Kovenock and Roberson's (2012a, b) replication of Hausken's (2008a) equations and parameter restrictions do not enhance our insight into the defense and attack of reliability systems. This reply intends to fill the remaining understanding gaps.
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| 3 |
ID:
116237
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In our original comment, we showed that Hausken's characterization of Nash equilibrium is invalid for much of the parameter space examined and provided necessary conditions for his solution to hold. Most of the comments in his reply are either tangential or irrelevant. However, several of the claims made in the reply reveal continuing misunderstandings and gaps in his understanding. In this rejoinder, we briefly clarify the fundamental issues.
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| 4 |
ID:
116238
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Kovenock and Roberson's [2011] comment provides initial work which has the potential, when suitably extended, to advance the research frontier. Kovenock and Roberson's paper consists of three sections. The first section is an interesting introduction. The second section, titled 'Model and Main Result,' provides no contribution beyond Hausken [2008a]. It consists of Equations (1)-(10) which are equivalent to equations developed by Hausken, and Equation (11) which is equivalent to the utility requirements u??0 and U??0 provided after Equation (17) in Hausken. The third section provides interesting ideas about mixed-strategy equilibria that can be extended in future research.
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