| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
A reaction by the Indian military to a series of violent crises with Pakistan, beginning with the Kargil conflict of 1999, Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) envisions limited attacks on Pakistan territory as non-nuclear retaliation against asymmetric and proxy attacks. Cold Start Doctrine and Pakistani responses show that the South Asian region is still adjusting to the consequences of overt nuclearization in 1998. India and Pakistan remain prone to arms racing and vulnerable to destablization. CSD is part of an action-reaction process, increasing risks of war and the risk that nuclear weapons would be used should war occur. It worsens the natural tension between India's desire for resolution through conventional conflict and Pakistan's declared willingness to escalate to nuclear first use. For India, CSD increases incentives to abandon its previous commitment to nuclear No First Use. Probable Pakistani responses include development of tactical nuclear weapons, forward deployment of nuclear forces, and pre-delegation of launch authority, increasing its problems of force protection, command and control, and escalation control. This article concludes, based on reliable sources, that neither of these war-like strategies benefits the two nuclear rivals as each state's policy options confront certain issues that invite strategic instability in South Asian region and should be reconsidered.
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