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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
116509
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
We develop an input-output methodology to estimate how Chinese exports affected the country's total domestic value added (DVA) and employment in the years 2002 and 2007. For every US$1000 dollar of Chinese exports in 2007 (2002), DVA and employment are estimated to be US$591 (US$466) and 0.096 (0.242) person-year, respectively. To implement these estimations, we use hitherto unpublished Chinese government data to construct several completely new datasets, including an input-output table with separate input-output and employment-output coefficients for processing exports, non-processing exports, and output for domestic use. We hypothesize that, in comparison with the export sector, China's domestic sector would be relatively autarkic due to China's history of central planning. We expect that exports would generate less DVA and employment than output for domestic use. Processing exports, which are highly dependent on imported inputs, would similarly generate less DVA and employment than non-processing exports. Our findings support these expectations. For both 2002 and 2007, the DVA and employment effects of domestic final demand were higher than those of non-processing exports, which were in turn higher than those of processing exports. However, with the progress of economic reforms, we found that the total DVAs of exports and domestic final demand have converged from 2002 to 2007.
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| 2 |
ID:
156462
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| Summary/Abstract |
The existence of economic slack or inefficiency is a common phenomenon of economies that operate under mandatory central planning. It implies that the economy operates in the interior of its set of production possibilities and not on its frontier. It also implies that output can be increased without any increase in the inputs if the constraints which prevent the economy from operating on the frontier in the first place are removed. Thus, there is “surplus potential output” that is not directly observable and cannot be identified by conventional analysis of the relationship between inputs and output alone. The objective of this study is to attempt to identify and estimate the surplus potential output in the Chinese economy prior to its economic reform in 1978. This will help answer the question of how much of the Chinese economic growth since 1978 can be attributed to the reduction and elimination of the pre-existing economic slack. This question is important because the increase in output due to the reduction or elimination of the economic slack can only take effect once and cannot be continuing. It will also affect the attribution of the sources of Chinese economic growth. Our investigation suggests that a reasonable estimate of the magnitude of the surplus potential output of the Chinese economy on the eve of its reform is approximately 50% of the actual realized output in 1978.
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| 3 |
ID:
177623
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| Summary/Abstract |
The China-U.S. trade war reduced the Chinese growth rate from 6.9 percent in 2017 to 6.1 percent in 2019. The COVID-19 epidemic has lowered the rate further to 1.8 percent in the first half of 2020 and to a projected 3.4 percent for 2020 as a whole. The trade war caused only a very slight decline in the U.S. growth rate in 2019, but the COVID-19 epidemic has resulted in a projected contraction of 5.3 percent in 2020. Assuming that half of the Chinese exports to the United States were halted, it would imply a total loss of Chinese GDP of almost 1 percent, or approximately US$135 billion (in 2019 prices). Assuming that half of U.S. exports of goods to China were halted, it would imply a loss of U.S. GDP of 0.22 percent, or approximately US$47 billion. The costs of the trade war are higher for China than for the United States both absolutely and relatively. The loss of Chinese GDP due to COVID-19 in 2020 may be estimated as 3.5 percent of its 2019 value, or US$0.5 trillion. The corresponding loss of U.S. GDP may be estimated as 8.1 percent of its 2019 value, or US$1.73 trillion.
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