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ZHANG, YONGJING
(2)
answer(s).
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Item
1
ID:
157828
Timing of third-party intervention in social conflict
/ Zhang, Yongjing; Chang, Yang-Ming
Chang, Yang-Ming
Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract
This paper analyzes how the equilibrium outcome of social conflict between factions is strategically altered by third-party intervention. We consider an intervening third party that commits financial support to one of two contending factions for reducing its cost in conflict. Within the framework of three-player sequential-move games, we investigate the questions as follows. What is the optimal intervention intensity in terms of the third party’s financial support? Is there a first-mover advantage in conflict when there is third-party intervention? Fighting against all odds, will the unsupported faction have a chance to prevail when its opponent receives third-party support? What is the optimal timing of third-party intervention? The analysis in the paper has implications for the conditions under which the strategic intervention of a third party may or may not break a conflict between factions.
Key Words
Conflict
;
Third-Party Intervention
;
Sequential Game
;
First-Mover Advantage
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2
ID:
116521
View from behavioral political economy on China's institutional
/ Zhang, Yongjing
Zhang, Yongjing
Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication
2012.
Summary/Abstract
A behavioral political economy framework is built on the basis of prospect theory to explain the induced and imposed institutional changes during China's market reform, giving special attention to the integrated effects of economic and political institutions. According to prospect theory, how rulers frame their decisions - in the prospects of gains or losses, influences how much risk they will take. China's market reform has been largely framed in the prospects of economic gains, for which the continuously growing private sector is the driving force. China's central government adopts a growth-oriented incremental reform that coincides with the prediction of prospect theory.
Key Words
Political Economy
;
China
;
Institutional Change
;
Behavioral Economics
;
Incremental Reform
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