Query Result Set
Skip Navigation Links
   ActiveUsers:639Hits:24752947Skip Navigation Links
Show My Basket
Contact Us
IDSA Web Site
Ask Us
Today's News
HelpExpand Help
Advanced search

  Hide Options
Sort Order Items / Page
INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY VOL: 27 NO 3 (4) answer(s).
 
SrlItem
1
ID:   116159


Argument for reflexivity in intelligence work / Hansen, Flemming Splidsboel   Journal Article
Hansen, Flemming Splidsboel Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication 2012.
Summary/Abstract In general, so it is argued in this article, the intelligence community would benefit from an agenda of greater and more conscious reflexivity. This increased self-awareness should as a minimum be applied to the areas of collection, analysis and communication, and it should bring members of the intelligence community to habitually reassess both procedures and standards of their work. Such a process promises to improve analysis, reduce misunderstandings in communication and increase public trust in the intelligence community. It will, in short, help the intelligence community prepare for a turbulent future.
        Export Export
2
ID:   116160


Federal Bureau of Investigation and change / Svendsen, Adam D M   Journal Article
Svendsen, Adam D M Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication 2012.
Summary/Abstract In this article, shortcomings with US domestic counter-terrorism intelligence and associated efforts since 2000 are analysed. Potential suggestions for the extended development of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are then discussed. Some of these propositions touch on developments involving the domestic intelligence and security services of other countries, and explore their use concerning the future optimization of the FBI in the area of domestic counter-terrorism intelligence. Within the overall culture and operational approach of the FBI, today greater sustained emphasis still needs to be accorded to the 'intelligence methodology' of 'wait and watch'. Simultaneously, the FBI needs to keep moving more from mainly a post facto emphasis to more of an a priori one in its investigations. Thereby, the FBI can continue to move towards improved delivery and better meet its role as a guarantor of US national security in a timely manner as the twenty-first century progresses.
        Export Export
3
ID:   116161


Intelligence studies centers: making scholarship on intelligence analysis useful / Marrin, Stephen   Journal Article
Marrin, Stephen Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication 2012.
Summary/Abstract Improving intelligence analysis requires bridging the gap between scholarship and practice. Intelligence studies as an academic discipline is not very theoretical compared to the more established disciplines of political science and international relations. In terms of conceptual depth, levels of abstraction and theoretical development, even the theoretical portions of the academic intelligence studies literature could be described as policy relevant and potentially useful for practitioners, including intelligence analysts. Yet despite this orientation to the practitioner, there is still a substantial gap between scholars and practitioners, thus replicating within a more applied context the conventional theory/practice divide that exists in other fields. Those fields do, however, possess a variety of ideas and recommendations that could be used to bring scholarship on intelligence analysis closer to practice. If implemented, these ideas might help actualize the benefits of scholarship that are as yet still unrealized potential.
        Export Export
4
ID:   116158


Israeli intelligence and the Czech–Egyptian arms deal / Leslau, Ohad   Journal Article
Leslau, Ohad Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication 2012.
Summary/Abstract This article uses records, recently made available, to shed new light on the way Israeli intelligence evaluated and interpreted the political and military implications of the Czech-Egyptian arms deal (1955). The evidence suggests that the intelligence services did not have the capabilities to cope with such an event. For the first two months following public exposure of the deal, intelligence was not able to present a coherent and evidence-based description regarding the extent of the deal and its implications. Subsequently, their assessment of the deal's implications evolved from gloomy and anxious to calm and reassuring. Causes of the intelligence service's difficulties in evaluating the situation's effects and the role of their assessment in shaping Israeli policy are discussed.
        Export Export