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| 1 |
ID:
172863
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| Summary/Abstract |
North Korea is a unique regime that has not followed the ‘mono-transition’ path (economic reform under modified one-party rule) of other surviving communist regimes (China, Vietnam, Cuba) in the post-Cold War era. Debates over North Korea's unique features (reluctance in economic reform, absence of political modification, international troublemaking) have generated two contending interpretations. The mainstream interpretation attributes North Korea's uniqueness to its regime's highly rigid political system (‘monolithic leadership system’). For the alternative interpretation, structural pressures and political calculus have driven the monolithic regime towards economic reform (‘marketization from above’), making it more convergent with the ‘mono-transition’ regimes, at least in the economic aspect. In support of the latter interpretation, this article will delve further into three contentious issues that represent the most common doubts about the advance of marketization in North Korea. First, how can the regime reconcile marketization with the interests of its ‘core constituencies’? Second, since ‘crony socialism’ exists, how does it influence distribution and productive activity? Third, how does marketization advance in view of the persistence of monolithic rule? In so doing, it will show how the sources of economic reform (structural factors and political calculus) have enabled the marketization constraints to be overcome.
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| 2 |
ID:
160010
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| Summary/Abstract |
In response to the challenge of unstable North Korea (weak economy, weapons of mass destruction [WMD] development), China has followed an engagement-oriented strategy based on diplomatic persuasion, economic interaction and moderate economic sanctions. Intensified engagement (2009–2012) facilitated North Korean convergence with China in respect of economic reform but divergence has persisted over WMD development. Despite the widening of divergence since 2013, China has refrained from applying crippling sanctions. This article seeks to explain these diverging results and their implications for China's strategy towards North Korea. Reviewing recent literature and data, it will argue that Chinese economic input reinforced the trend of economic reform that formed the basis of political consolidation under the new hereditary regime. On the other hand, the prospect of stable dependence on China ran counter to that regime's pursuit of WMDs as the basis of security and diplomatic diversification. These mixed results reveal the limits of China's strategy: its economic input involuntarily reinforces North Korea's WMD potential but it is not prepared to accept the risks of enforcing WMD restraint by crippling sanctions either. With limited room for manoeuvre, the attainment of China's strategic objectives ultimately depends upon policy change from the US or South Korea.
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| 3 |
ID:
117050
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The existence of cooperative labor relations within leading firms in South Korea (hereafter Korea), amid unfavorable national-level economic and political institutions, merits study by comparative political economists. Late industrializing Korea lacks the conditions that sustain cooperative labor relations in other nonliberal capitalist countries like Germany and Japan. More relevant, therefore, are debates over the emergence and practice of "high performance work systems" (HPWS) in the unfavorable environments of advanced liberal and developing country capitalism. As a successful late industrializing country that combines both advanced and developing capitalism characteristics, Korea represents a useful testing ground for ideas about HPWS. This article will examine cooperation in four leading Korean firms and use the findings to advance key HPWS debates about the possibilities of participation and the conditions under which cooperation can emerge and be sustained.
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| 4 |
ID:
177666
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| Summary/Abstract |
China’s policy of restraint (avoidance of crippling economic sanctions) towards North Korean provocation is typically explained in terms of geopolitical concern with North Korean regime stability. The strategic and diplomatic costs of restraint would suggest the presence of non-geopolitical influences behind China’s approach. Ideational explanations emphasise the persistence of shared socialist identity as well as the traditional Sino-centric worldview as shaping influences. There is much less detailed analysis of how China views North Korea’s political economic evolution and how this view has changed over time to produce fluctuations in the bilateral relationship. In order to capture China’s motivations more fully, I introduce two additional variables, namely China’s view of the state of its own reform path (which provides the domestic context shaping policy towards North Korea), and the extent of North Korea’s readiness to prioritise economic reform. I will then use these variables to explain two contrasting phases which represented the worst (1992–1999) and best (2009–2012) of times in the bilateral relationship in the post-Cold War era. These variables also help us to understand the potentials and limitations of the upturn in bilateral relations which has occurred since 2018.
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| 5 |
ID:
127797
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Unlike other surviving communist regimes (China, Vietnam, Cuba), North Korea has not been able to achieve sustained growth by reforming its economy. This article will trace the failure of economic reform in North Korea to the prevailing system of political governance based on Monolithic Leadership System (MLS) reinforced by Military First Politics (MFP). The political risk aversion of the MLS-MFP system permits only an ultra cautious reform strategy, but the potential of even ultra cautious reform cannot be fully realized. The detrimental effects of the MLS-MFP system include: excessive restriction of the development of grassroots capitalism; entrenchment of the wasteful economics of militarization and the perpetuation of international isolation. The combination of stubborn regime under economic duress sets off a vicious circle of economic failure, anti-marketization, and external confrontation. Escape from this predicament depends on external initiative focused on steering the regime back onto the path of ultra cautious reform, especially by easing its need for militarization. The viability of such an initiative depends on the extent the US is prepared to accept the regime in its current form.
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