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ID:
132947
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Reforms carried out by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have long followed a traditional model of "experimentation under hierarchy." This article will attempt to develop this model further by building a framework to illustrate the influence of both the political dynamics of hierarchical central-local relations and local economic circumstances in the introduction of large-scale political reforms. The initiation and expansion of "experimental points" are only permitted in those select few provinces with both favourable political and economic local conditions, allowing the CCP to minimize risk and make informed decisions regarding possibilities for nationwide reform. This article proposes that the hierarchical interaction of central and local political elites, and in particular provincial secretaries, can explain the extent of reforms, whereas the type of reform is linked to distinct provincial economic conditions and the provincial secretary's interpretation of provincial priorities. Put succinctly, the CCP's model of political reform can be specifically characterized as "experimentation under hierarchy in local conditions." This article presents a detailed discussion of both the political and economic considerations inherent in this concept, and provides examples of reform programmes in Guangdong and Sichuan to illustrate the model in practice.
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| 2 |
ID:
138735
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| Summary/Abstract |
Critics claim that lack of professionalism among Afghan provincial leaders undermines the government’s legitimacy, creating opportunities for the insurgency. Data on provincial governors show that those most effective at deterring insurgent attacks tend to have qualities associated with “warlords” rather than professionalism. Decentralization could harness these characteristics to improve governance.
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| 3 |
ID:
146666
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| Summary/Abstract |
DP Mishra, chief minister of Madhya Pradesh from 1963 to 1967 and twice minister in Central Provinces and Berar (1937–1939, 1946–1950), was a key figure in Congress politics and provincial governance from the pre- to the post-independence period in India. Mishra was a noted Patel acolyte and a vocal critic of Nehru. A Brahmin leader, he identified with an elite-based Hindu politics of caste and community. He was also an efficient administrator and his career peaked in 1966–1967 when he acted as a counsellor to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. In this paper, I argue that his political life is an important prism through which to view Congress politics, its High Command culture, its character in provinces/states and its continuities with the colonial state in governance.
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| 4 |
ID:
137458
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| 5 |
ID:
117134
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| 6 |
ID:
179295
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| Summary/Abstract |
African regimes commonly use strategies of balanced ethnic representation to build support. Decentralisation reforms, often promoted in order to improve political representation and state access, can undermine such strategies. In this article we use the example of the DR Congo to show the extent to which the multiplication of decentralised provinces is upending a political system largely based until now upon collective ethnic representation in the state. Not only are Congo's new provinces more ethnically homogeneous than their predecessors, but many of them have also witnessed political takeover and monopolisation by the province's dominant ethnic group. In addition, the increased number of Congolese who now find themselves non-autochthonous to their province of residence heightens their vulnerability and the potential for local conflict. Decentralisation, whose intent was proximity to governance, might well end up excluding more Congolese from the benefits of political representation. The article uses original empirical evidence on provincial ethnic distributions to support its claims.
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