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| 1 |
ID:
066727
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| 2 |
ID:
059719
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| Publication |
Jan-Feb 2005.
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| 3 |
ID:
167949
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| Summary/Abstract |
The purpose of this paper is to assess the strategic environment of the Republic
of Korea (ROK) and to examine what strategies the ROK will develop ahead of
the 2020 NPT Review Conference. Nuclear arms control policy-making is very
complex for the ROK because of its specific security dilemma. And the role and
strategy of the ROK in international regimes are increasingly important for the
ROK’s security and status in the world. Thus, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons and its review process including the Review Conference and
Preparatory Committee are particularly essential to the ROK. In 2020 when the
10th Review Conference will be held, the ROK should present an appropriate
strategy. For this, this article first outlines the establishment and development of the
NPT and its review process from 1995 to 2015, after the Cold War and the North
Korean nuclear issue was raised. And it describes the ROK’s role played in the
NPT on the basis of its three pillars and suggests what strategies Korea must retain:
Nuclear disarmament and security assurances from Russia and China; Coercing the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to rejoin the NPT; Continuing the
momentum of the Nuclear Security Summit; and Setting and leading a new agenda.
This study concludes with a forecast that the year 2020 will be a major turning point
for Korea.
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| 4 |
ID:
059718
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| Publication |
Jan-Feb 2005.
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| 5 |
ID:
059721
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| Publication |
Jan-Feb 2005.
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| 6 |
ID:
098800
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The United States had mixed results at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. On the one hand, it avoided the isolation and criticism directed at Washington in connection with the failed 2005 Review Conference, in large measure because the Obama administration took more congenial positions on a number of nuclear issues. Its cooperation also facilitated the successful achievement of a consensus final document. On the other hand, there was wide resistance to a number of measures for strengthening the NPT system favoured or promoted by the United States, resistance that reveals deep and worrying divisions within the regime.
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| 7 |
ID:
066707
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| 8 |
ID:
065107
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| 9 |
ID:
141019
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| Summary/Abstract |
"Once upon a time all the animals in the Zoo decided that they would disarm, and they arranged to have a conference to arrange the matter. So the Rhinoceros said when he opened the proceedings that the use of teeth was barbarous and horrible and ought to be strictly prohibited by general consent. Horns, which were mainly defensive weapons, would, of course, have to be allowed. The Buffalo, the Stag, the Porcupine, and even the little Hedgehog all said they would vote with the Rhino, but the Lion and the Tiger took a different view. They defended teeth and even claws, which they described as honorable weapons of immemorial antiquity."
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| 10 |
ID:
018269
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| Publication |
Winter 2000.
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| Description |
30-35
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| 11 |
ID:
066726
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| 12 |
ID:
060919
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| 13 |
ID:
066729
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