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ID:
126823
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In this paper, we analyze the rationale for an energy policy mix when the European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is considered from a public choice perspective. That is, we argue that the economic textbook model of the ETS implausibly assumes (1) efficient policy design and (2) climate protection as the single objective of policy intervention. Contrary to these assumptions, we propose that the ETS originates from a political bargaining game within a context of multiple policy objectives. In particular, the emissions cap is negotiated between regulators and emitters with the emitters' abatement costs as crucial bargaining variable. This public choice view yields striking implications for an optimal policy mix comprising RES supporting policies. Whereas the textbook model implies that the ETS alone provides sufficient climate protection, our analysis suggests that support for renewable energies (1) contributes to a more effective ETS-design and (2) may even increase the overall efficiency of climate and energy policy if other externalities and policy objectives besides climate protection are considered. Thus, our analysis also shows that a public choice view not necessarily entails negative evaluations concerning efficiency and effectiveness of a policy mix.
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| 2 |
ID:
125557
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the presence of learning spillovers related to renewable energy technologies, an optimal strategy to mitigate climate change should complement an emissions tax by a subsidy for renewables. This article addresses the question how such subsidy should be designed. It is shown that the widely-used approach of a revenue-neutral fixed feed-in tariff can yield an optimal outcome under restrictive conditions only. It has to be adapted continuously as the electricity price changes. Moreover, funding the tariff by a surcharge on the electricity price has important implications for the design of the emission tax. The optimal tax rate has to be below the Pigovian level, differentiated across fossil fuels and adapted over time as the patterns of technological development change. These requirements may pose a formidable challenge for practical decision-making. However, it is important to point out that the eventual choices made with respect to the design and funding of a feed-in tariff have to be based on a careful and more comprehensive policy assessment, including, inter alia, economic effects beyond the electricity sector and existing institutional constraints.
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| 3 |
ID:
117272
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In virtually all EU Member States, the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is complemented by support schemes for electricity generation from renewable energy sources (RES-E). This policy mix has been subject to strong criticism. It is mainly argued that RES-E schemes contribute nothing to emissions reduction and undermine the cost-effectiveness of the EU ETS. Consequently, many scholars suggest the abolition of RES-E schemes. However, this conclusion rests on quite narrow and unrealistic assumptions about the design and performance of markets and policies. This article provides a systematic and comprehensive review and discussion of possible rationales for combining the EU ETS with RES-E support schemes. The first and most important reason may be restrictions to technology development and adoption. These may be attributed to the failure of markets as well as policies, and more generally to the path dependency in socio-technical systems. Under these conditions, RES-E schemes are required to reach sufficient levels of technology development. In addition, it is highlighted that in contrast to the EU ETS RES-E support schemes may provide benefits beyond mitigating climate change.
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