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| 1 |
ID:
117350
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the period before Britain joined the European Economic Community in 1973 the founding Six set up agricultural and budgetary policies which worked to Britain's disadvantage and caused friction over a long time. After a lengthy battle to obtain a rebate on contributions to the EU budget, which came to a close with the Fontainebleau Agreement of 1984, the UK contributed to a more liberal, open Europe, especially with regard to the single market and trade and foreign policy. There were sporadic bursts of leadership, as exemplified by Margaret Thatcher's work to complete the single market and Tony Blair's on European security. Britain has been a successful and influential member of the EU, except in a few areas where it has showed reluctance or opted out, most notably treaty change and Economic and Monetary Union. In spite of this, and of the problems that lie ahead in these areas, the balance sheet on both sides is positive.
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| 2 |
ID:
117356
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2012.
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A useful analytic distinction between structural and policy differences was made by Henry Kissinger; the former must be accommodated while the latter may be resolved. There is no shortage of tensions and disagreements between the United States and the nations of Europe. Likewise, the bilateral alliance between Britain and the US has been defined in part by disagreements. Even during the Second World War, when the relationship was redefined in modern terms, there were strong conflicts despite the extraordinary incentives for cooperation.
From the start, a key strength of the Anglo-American alliance was emphasis on institutional structures for the long term, viewed as a complement to the essential immediate cooperation in fighting and ultimately defeating the Axis powers. The insight of Jean Monnet and others in employing economic tools for political and diplomatic ends has proven essential. The fortieth anniversary of Britain's entry into the European Community is a useful benchmark for retrospective analysis. For the US, the twin commitments of an active international role and unification of Europe around economic matters has been remarkably consistent. As John Mearsheimer has argued, the end of the Cold War removed fundamental incentives for cooperation. Nonetheless, institutional structures of both the EU and NATO have survived.
Britain traditionally has been reluctant to engage in continuous institutional engagement with Europe, beyond the requirements of military alliances helpful or essential to national security. The lengthy uneven character of the road to membership in Europe's economic institutions reflects this fundamental attitude. Currently, Britain's ambiguous role of participation in European institutions but not in the euro may in fact facilitate transatlantic cooperation, and illustrates the usefulness of Kissinger's point. The fading of militarism in Europe since 1945 is a fundamental accomplishment, often overlooked in contemporary economic debate.
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| 3 |
ID:
117353
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2012.
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This article examines four elements of City of London thinking related to Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and European financial regulation, and includes previously unpublished material.
City opinion on EMU and prospective UK membership has been divided. Sceptics have rightly stressed the risks facing a monetary union of disparate economies without a robust fiscal framework, but naively believed that threats to the City from EMU members could not arise because of the rules of the single market. Enthusiasts wilfully neglected the economic risks but emphasized the regulatory threats to City competitiveness if the UK were outside. The UK regulatory philosophy stressing freedom for cross-border competition and light regulation of financial markets was never accepted by many continental member states, numerous impediments to competition persisted and potentially damaging attempts were made to exclude the City from key financial and legal provisions on the grounds that the UK was not participating in EMU. Being at the negotiating table averted those threats, but now goodwill has levelled off and the liberal regulatory philosophy is in retreat. Despite reservations about EMU, City institutions made crucial but little-known contributions to the practical implementation of the euro, stressing the scale and nature of the tasks of converting banking IT systems, the logistics of changing notes and coins and the need for legal certainty. They helped to persuade the European Commission to accept the phased introduction of the euro and the legal framework.
Now EMU faces an existential threat and the financial system faces more regulation at EU and UK levels. The position taken by the UK at the December 2011 European Council, ostensibly defending the City but risking marginalization, dismayed many City figures who would be more willing to compromise to preserve access to the single market-but Eurosceptic hedge funds, the least regulated financial sector, retain considerable lobbying power.
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| 4 |
ID:
117354
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Europe has long divided the UK's political parties, especially the Conservatives and Labour. The parliamentary vote to enter the Common Market relied on rebel pro-European Labour MPs, while in the 1980s Labour was calling for withdrawal. If a decade on the Conservative Party saw a growing number of rebels against the Treaty of Maastricht, three decades later those Tory rebels-alongside a new party established to oppose membership, the UK Independence Party-have grown in number and look to the UK's ultimate withdrawal from the EU. This article explores the impact of European integration on British party politics, examining the ways in which it has caused division and fragmentation at the national level. It then looks at the impact of British membership on European level parties, which have also seen a degree of fragmentation owing to the nature of British parties.
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| 5 |
ID:
117352
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
One of the toughest issues at the time of UK accession to the EEC was the cost of being a member of the European club. The nature of the industrialized British economy ensured that the benefits of initial access were less pronounced than in other, longer-standing member states and quickly became a source of heated debate. Margaret Thatcher fought to get 'her money back' in the 1980s and the ensuing British rebate has become totemic for British politicians. As the European Union debates its next multi-annual budget, why has the budget proved so tricky for the UK? What are the drivers for the EU budget? And what is the rebate all about? This article argues that the UK has tugged in different directions over the EC-now EU-budget, which amounts to about 2 per cent of the Union's public expenditure. At times the UK has urged member states to improve financial management. At times it has pressed for greater redistribution between rich and poor regions through the budget. It has consistently criticized the large proportion of the budget going to support agriculture in the Union. It has, from the earliest days of its accession negotiations, argued about how much it contributes to the EU budget and how it should contribute less, whether it counted among the poorer or the richer member states. Britain has argued first for restraint, rather than promoting certain policy sectors in a consistent manner. While cohesion and competitiveness targets outlined in the 2000 Lisbon Strategy received strong support from the UK government and the Europe 2020 goals set concrete growth targets in line with the UK's own, this policy-shaping is tempered by constraint and restraint, and has not allowed the UK to draw full political benefit from the EU budget.
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| 6 |
ID:
117355
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The UK, with France, initiated the European, today Common, Security and Defence Policy (ESDP/CSDP) in 1998-9. A strong consensus on the need to address capability shortfalls, which the UK accepted to attempt under the EU flag, however masked the lack of consensus about the extent to which the EU would also make policy and launch operations (which would require permanent planning and conduct structures). This debate about the degree of EU autonomy vis-à-vis NATO and the US is one of the reasons why Europeans collectively have no strategic vision on the regions and scenarios for which they should assume responsibility, as the Libyan crisis demonstrated. But also on the capability side, the UK in the end never fully committed, withholding the necessary budget to allow the European Defence Agency to operate as intended and resisting moves towards military integration, such as Permanent Structured Cooperation, in favour of bilateral arrangements such as the 2010 agreement with France. Meanwhile, however, the US came to demand that Europe take charge, autonomously, of crisis management in its own neighbourhood. British policy now seems to have struck a dead end. London has managed to slow down the CSDP. NATO has seen even fewer results in capability development, but when it comes to operations, in the absence of US leadership NATO is equally blocked by the lack of a collective European strategic vision. London, with Paris, remains the only European actor able and willing to engage in crisis management and war, but cannot mobilize many other capitals to join in. Unlike the US, the UK does not have the means to go in alone if necessary. A fundamental revision of policy is needed if the UK wants to maintain its level of influence in security and defence.
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| 7 |
ID:
117351
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| Publication |
2012.
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This article examines the nature and impact of changing media coverage of European integration in Britain from accession to the European Economic Community in 1973 to the present day. It does so through a consideration of the causes behind the collapse of the 'permissive consensus' on European affairs, which since the time of the 1975 referendum has given way to a form of 'destructive dissent' across vast swaths of the written and broadcast media, particularly noticeable in the UK tabloids. The collapse in media support for the EU project has been expressed in a number of ways, some of them bordering on the nationalist and/or xenophobic, and opportunities for the expression of such views have merely been increased by the EU's own efforts to deepen integration in the face of widespread popular distrust of both national politicians and supranational constitution-building. The article alights on the 'Rupert Murdoch effect' as a core explanation for this general shift in attitudes, as market leader on Euroscepticism expressed in agenda-setting outlets such as the Sun, The Times and The Sunday Times. The newspaper mogul's commercial interests in promoting deregulated media markets have kept him closely watchful of European affairs in Britain, and he has proved particularly willing to back leaders and parties he believes will be most conducive to the furtherance of these interests. The article suggests that Murdoch led the way in creating a climate of fear around European matters that severely tested the leadership qualities of even notionally pro-European prime ministers on this vexed question in British politics. Newspapers might not be able to tell people what to think, but they can affect what they think about, and News International, with willing support from ideological Eurosceptics across the top-selling UK tabloid and broadsheets, has proved effective at keeping the British public in a permanent state of 'war' with the EU since the 1980s.
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