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ID: 148682

Financial markets matter more than fiscal institutions for the success of the Euro / Jones, Erik

Jones, Erik	Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract

Many argue that the euro is handicapped as a currency because European governments are unwilling to pool responsibility for fiscal policy in common institutions. This argument is derived from the theory of optimum currency areas and fuelled by analogy with US experience. It is mistaken. A monetary union does not need a fiscal union to work. Worse, efforts to build European fiscal institutions are likely to distract European policymakers from a more important agenda. Europe needs a fully functioning banking union with a common risk-free asset if Europeans want to stabilise the euro as a common currency. Moreover, it would need these things even if the euro did not exist and all it had was the common market. Financial stability – and not fiscal federalism – is the key to Europe's future. European policymakers should focus their efforts on building the necessary institutions.

Key Words

Euro ; Financial Crisis ; Fiscal Federalism ; Banking Union ; Sudden Stop

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ID: 117704

Policy lessons from the Eurozone crisis / Angeloni, Chiara; Merler, Silvia; Wolff, Guntram B

Angeloni, Chiara	Journal Article
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2012.

Summary/Abstract

The current European crisis has shed light on several weaknesses and the institutional incompleteness characterizing the euro area. The manifestation of Europe's fragility was preceded by a large build-up of debt in the private sector, associated with national current account divergences and the deterioration of competitiveness particularly of the euro periphery countries. With the economic situation deteriorating, private sector debt became less credible, contaminating banks' balance sheets and placing a heavy burden on governments. A sovereign-bank vicious circle emerged: on the one hand, with banking risk translating into higher sovereign risk because of the governments' guarantor role and, on the other hand, with the deterioration of government's creditworthiness affecting the banking systems through banks' sovereign bond holdings. In principle, this negative feedback can be stopped by breaking one of the channels of transmission. A banking union at the European level is proposed as one solution.

Key Words

European Sovereign Crisis ; Banking Union ; Macroeconomic Imbalances

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