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ID:
154335
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| Summary/Abstract |
How have European cross-border defence industrial mergers and acquisitions affected domestic procurement bias among the major EU powers? This article departs from the findings of Andrew Moravcsik more than two decades ago suggesting that major West European states had no ingrained preferences for defence industrial autarchy. When cross-national armament projects were derailed, this could be attributed to political efforts of national defence industrial champions favouring purely domestic projects. As former national champions join pan-European defence groups, their preferences are likely modified. Does this shift procurement towards non-European “off-the-shelf” solutions which, according to Moravcsik, are favoured by defence departments? Or does it give impetus to a stronger preference for European as opposed to domestic systems? In this article, procurement patterns in the aftermath of cross-border defence industry consolidation will be analysed. Procurement bias is assessed in two industry segments characterised by pervasive consolidation.
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| 2 |
ID:
117897
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article argues that aspirations of maintaining a dominant influence over sub-Saharan security issues has spurred the French and British leadership of European Union (EU) foreign and security policy integration, just as it has informed military capability expansions by the armed forces of the main EU powers. While Europe's initial African focus was on stabilising a continent marred by state failure, civil wars and genocides, changes in the global security context, especially the shift towards multipolarity manifest in China's growing engagement, has prompted a complementary focus on deterring other powers from making military inroads into the subcontinent. Hence Europe's sub-Saharan security focus is shifting from stabilisation towards deterrence. This helps explain recent military procurements which, in spite of the extremely challenging fiscal position of most EU member states, feature large-scale investments in long-range deterrence capabilities.
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| 3 |
ID:
185355
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| Summary/Abstract |
Why did Denmark and Norway opt for respectively a domestic “make” and a “buy” abroad approach when acquiring comparable major surface combatants given both host a capable shipbuilding industry? Three explanations are examined: (1) Balancing concerns inch small states towards “buy” abroad decisions, if requirements are deemed urgent and if junior alliance partners fear abandonment by senior partners. Junior partners by contrast prefer “make at home” if entanglement is a greater concern. (2) National innovation systems can be biased towards large projects, such as complex warship programmes, or have a knowledge diffusion focus emphasising niche capabilities. The former point to a “make” decision whereas the latter is inclined towards “buy.” (3) Domestic defence industry advocate “make” decisions with the qualification that weaker firms favour “buy” with offset arrangements. Political executives balance job creation with military capability, but recent adverse domestic procurement experiences may prompt governments to favour “buy.”
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