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| 1 |
ID:
148154
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper applies the framework of affective intelligence theory—a theory of how emotions affect attitudes, beliefs, and decision making—to elite learning during war time. Doing so provides novel hypotheses about when and how war leaders respond to new events. These hypotheses are tested using a set of cases drawn from the Winter War. Findings suggest that these emotion-derived hypotheses may be more effective in predicting learning and its absence than purely Bayesian or extant cognitive models of learning.
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| 2 |
ID:
146196
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| Summary/Abstract |
Military successes present war leaders with a choice between maintaining their existing aims and strategy and changing one or the other to extend their gains or make the war cheaper. “Staying the course” minimizes the risk of failure but also foregoes possible gains. Making a change increases the risk of failure but leaves nothing on the table. I argue that emotional responses—particularly contentment and joy—account for leaders’ preferences for changing or maintaining their approach to war. Joy, elicited by novel good news, makes change more likely because it leads to the derogation of risks and obstacles. Contentment, elicited by expected good news, tends to produce resistance to change. I substantiate my claims through World War II-era case studies from Japan and the United States.
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| 3 |
ID:
117991
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Discussions of weapons taboos have failed to take into account the possibility that prescriptive international and national norms of behavior may come into conflict. Using psychological studies of trade-offs and protected values as a guide, this article argues that when these conflicts exist, the taboos' individual-level constraining effects can be vitiated. An analysis of General George Marshall's proposal to use chemical weapons against the Japanese in 1945 demonstrates that normative conflict can produce a readiness to violate weapons taboos. In these situations, state decisions to violate taboos may depend on the extent to which the perception of normative conflict is shared by other decision makers and society more generally.
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| 4 |
ID:
160492
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| Summary/Abstract |
Scholars often find that highlands and rural areas foster insurgencies. However, others have argued that cities can also be centers of insurgent activity and that nonterritorial insurgencies are different from territorial guerilla wars. We expect that in a nonterritorial insurgency, the high quality of local knowledge makes populated rural areas inhospitable to nonterritorial insurgent activity. Using data from a random sample of about 750 Médaille de la Résistance Française recipients, we find that departments with more residents in cities and large towns had more medal recipients than rural departments. Analyses of repression patterns (finding that insurgent arrests are less likely in cities than rural areas) and the historical record provide further evidence for the information mechanism.
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