| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
118000
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2013.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The US billion dollars investments in cyber security are creating a securitisation of cyberspace. What has happened meanwhile in Europe? The argument is threefold. First, cyber threats were raised to the national threat level in Germany (2006), France (2008) and the UK (2008), but the justifications put forward for such an upgrade did not hold, as well as invested resources at that point in time. Second, cyber security strategy followed up this upgrade and designed a framework to tackle the threat that was found coherent with the assessment of the respective national security strategies. Third, cyber insecurity stemmed from criminals operating in cyberspace. Therefore, deterring criminals should have been at the core of tackling cyber insecurity but the defence strategies of France, Germany and the UK were instead focused on mitigating the effects of cyber attacks.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
122268
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2013.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
In the wake of Stuxnet, there has been an increasing tendency on the part of politicians and analysts to see the sophistication of a cyber-attack as an indication of its perpetrator. Indeed, the more sophisticated the attack, the more sophisticated the attacker, thereby pointing to a state actor as the culprit - or so it is argued. However, Clement Guitton and Elaine Korzak note the lack of clarity and inconsistency around the term 'sophistication', contending that it is context-dependent and therefore that it cannot be used unquestioningly in identifying the perpetrator of a cyber-attack.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|