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TRADE PROTECTION (2) answer(s).
 
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ID:   131503


Exchange rates and industry demands for trade protection / Broz, J. Lawrence; Werfel, Seth H   Journal Article
Broz, J. Lawrence Journal Article
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Publication 2014.
Summary/Abstract The recent confrontation between China and the United States over currency policy illustrates a broader phenomenon: exchange-rate misalignments tend to spill over into trade policy. Although previous studies have shown that aggregate protectionist activity is positively related to the level of the real effective exchange rate, we explore this relationship at the industry level. Several industry-specific characteristics determine the protectionist response to exchange rate changes, including the degree of exchange-rate pass-through, the level of import penetration, and the share of imported intermediate inputs in total industry inputs. We find that the marginal effect of currency appreciation on the number of industry-level antidumping petitions is positive and significant only for industries with high pass-through. Therefore, exchange rates appear to induce demands for trade barriers only in industries where competitiveness is directly harmed by currency appreciation.
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2
ID:   118177


Non-tariff protectionist bias in majoritarian politics: government subsidies and electoral institutions / Rickard, Stephanie J   Journal Article
Rickard, Stephanie J Journal Article
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Publication 2012.
Summary/Abstract Governments elected by majoritarian rules are, according to conventional wisdom, more protectionist than governments elected by proportional rules. However, existing tests of this claim examine only one possible form of trade protection: tariffs. This leaves open the possibility that governments in majoritarian systems provide no more protection than governments in proportional systems but simply use tariffs more often than other forms of trade protection. Does the protectionist bias in majoritarian politics extend beyond tariffs? The current study addresses this question by examining an increasingly important form of trade protection: subsidies. In a sample of 68 countries from 1990 to 2006, spending on subsidies is found to be higher in majoritarian systems than in proportional systems, holding all else equal. The implication is that the protectionist bias in majoritarian systems does in fact extend beyond tariffs.
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