| Publication |
2012-13.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Like his earlier works, Tom Ricks's The Generals: American Military
Command from World War II to Today, is entertaining and provocative, and has deservedly been the topic of numerous reviews,
blog posts, and discussions around the military. His central thesis is that,
since the Korean War, the United States Army has failed to produce
general officers who could link strategy with tactics. Ricks argues that one
remedy for this deficiency is for the Army to resume publicly firing division commanders for operational shortcomings as a means to increase
accountability, like it did under General George C. Marshall in World War
II. Ricks is on solid evidentiary ground while documenting the patterns
of relief for World War II division commanders, supplementing stories
with data. But in his discussion of the leaders of every war afterwards,
Ricks switches to anecdotes and assertions to make his case. He also shifts
his reference group from division commanders to theater commanders.
Much has changed in seventy years, but then, as now, there are significant
differences between two and four star generals. Thus, his argument is on
less-than-solid ground as he compares World War II "two-star apples" to
modern "four-star oranges."
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