| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
118533
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2012.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article reviews the Sino-Israel relationship from the Chinese perspective. It argues that the relationship is at a crossroad because China is increasingly more proactively involved in the international arena, which will inevitably lead to China's more assertive role in trying to facilitate solving the Israel-Palestinian conflicts. China has been inclined to be more supportive to the Palestinian side based on Chinese cultural values, traditionally stronger ties with Arab countries, and also since Palestine is generally considered as the weaker side of the conflict. A strong Israel-U.S. relationship will help balance Israel's relationship with China. The Sino-Israel relationship cannot be viewed out of the context of a Sino-U.S. relationship. China is more concerned with its relationship with the U.S., the only other world economy comparable in size to China's, in order to protect the peaceful world order for further development. Future Chinese involvement with the Palestinian region will be more constructive.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
168168
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Existing research on mediation finds that mediation by a strong mediator is both more prevalent and more conducive to a negotiated settlement. However, why disputants select a weak mediator remains unclear. From the perspective of the uncertainty mechanism, the nature of mediation is a procedure for sharing private information and reducing disputants’ uncertainty regarding the resolve to continue fighting. Disputants can benefit from mediation through gaining a comparative advantage regarding uncertainty by focusing on either controlling the sharing of their own information or increasing their opponents’ sharing of information. With regard to these two strategic choices, this article argues that the selection of a weak mediator is more likely when disputants prefer controlling the sharing of their information to expanding their opponents’ information sharing. Correspondingly, three potential factors that influence the disputants’ strategic choice of gaining a comparative advantage regarding uncertainty are applied, namely, a previous mediation in the dispute; the dispute’s level of hostility; and the power disparity between the disputants. The author compiles data from the International Crisis Behaviour (ICB, 1918–2015) data set and the International Conflict Management (ICM, 1945–2003) data set for the empirical analysis. The results show that mediation by a weak mediator is more likely when it is the first time that the disputants have submitted to mediation in the dispute and when the dispute’s level of hostility is low. In some cases, a large power disparity between the disputants also makes the selection of a weak mediator more likely.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|