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1 |
ID:
160907
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Summary/Abstract |
History suggests that the most probable consequence of the Singapore Summit will be difficult and lengthy negotiation followed by slow and inadequate compliance, quite possibly on both sides.
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2 |
ID:
137235
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Summary/Abstract |
Twenty years after the deal struck between the United States and North Korea over the nuclear crisis, the security environment on the Korean Peninsula remains unstable. When it comes to the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework from 1994 through 2002, previous research has paid scant attention to how the U.S. Congress responded to President Clinton’s accord with the Pyongyang regime. This article
provides a rare empirical assessment of what led America’s lawmakers to uphold or overturn the executive agreements with North Korea. The bottom-line finding is that politics hardly stops at the water’s edge, with “politics-as-usual” forces such as partisan conflicts ultimately having derailed Congressional commitments to the U.S.-DPRK accords. The results shed light on how and why domestic politics often redirects the course of international agreements, particularly in the era of
polarized politics.
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3 |
ID:
123572
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4 |
ID:
130239
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Publication |
2014.
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Summary/Abstract |
Almost every war that America has fought since the beginning of the twentieth century was a war America had determined to avoid. We were neutral in World War I?.?.?.?until unlimited submarine warfare against our trans-Atlantic shipping became intolerable. We resisted entering World War II until Pearl Harbor. We defined the Korean peninsula as lying outside our "defense perimeter," as our secretary of state declared in 1950, a few months before North Korea attacked South Korea and we leapt into the fray. A few years later, we rebuffed French appeals for support in Vietnam in order to avoid involving ourselves in that distant country which was soon to become the venue of our longest war and greatest defeat. In 1990, our ambassador to Iraq explained to Saddam Hussein that Washington had "no opinion on?.?.?.?your border disagreement with Kuwait," which he took as encouragement to swallow his small neighbor, forcing a half million Americans to travel around the world to force him to disgorge it. A year after that, our secretary of state quipped about the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia that "we have no dog in that fight," a sentiment echoed by his successor, of the opposite party, who, demonstrating his virtuosity at geography, observed that that country was "a long way from home" in a place where we lacked "vital interests"-all this not long before we sent our air force to bomb Serbia into ceasing its attacks on Bosnia and then bombed it again a few years later until it coughed up Kosovo.
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5 |
ID:
119738
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6 |
ID:
067124
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7 |
ID:
109261
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8 |
ID:
052971
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Publication |
Jul-Sep 2004.
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9 |
ID:
129299
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10 |
ID:
161506
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Summary/Abstract |
There is a lacuna in the literature analyzing the mid-term (6-24 months) period after a DPRK contingency that results in the Pyongyang regime’s relatively sudden and unmanaged fall. This article helps fill that gap, particularly with respect to security issues that would challenge Korean unification efforts during such a period. Following an Introduction, Section I first makes the case for a DPRK contingency being the most plausible end to the Pyongyang regime. Assuming the scenarios from Section I, Section II addresses the question of what critical issues a unifying Korea will face over the mid-term, and how dealing with these challenges will condition the type of end-state that a unified Korea will embody. In particular we examine three challenges: (a) mid-term security provision related to potential weapons proliferation, cyber-security, organized criminality, and human security; (b) the foundations of institution-building through measures dealing with issues of transitional justice, disputed land title claims, and generating broad domestic stakeholder buy-in in a unifying Korea; (c) the disposition of Korea’s strategic alignment in a Northeast Asia that will have undergone a major alteration of the regional system. Section III concludes with policy recommendations concerning what efforts should be made now to prepare for the situations described in Sections I and II.
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11 |
ID:
132043
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Publication |
2014.
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Summary/Abstract |
The Problems Facing Regional Cooperation in East Asia great efforts are being made in East Asia to improve regional and Gsub-regional multilateral cooperation in the face of a bottleneck. The key issues are listed below:
First, there is a mismatch between size and effectiveness. Generally speaking, the larger the cooperation organization the more con?icts that arise and thus the less effective they are. Because of efforts by countries such as the U.S.,2 Australia, Japan, and India to further their strategic or diplomatic interests, these organizations are growing in regional coverage, which causes issues to become diversified and in turn causes the organizations to lose sight of their mission. Subsequently, many regional or trans-regional multilateral organizations such as APEC, the East Asia Summit (EAS), and the ASEAN Security Forum are increasingly playing aless effective role. For example, APEC summits and the EAS usually just
end up with a symbolic proclamation without any substance or ' Han Caizhen is Professor at the School of lntemational Studies, Renmin University of China. Shi Yinhong is Counselor at the Counselors' Office at the State Council and Professor at the School of lntemational Studies, Renmin University ot'China
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12 |
ID:
056253
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13 |
ID:
153690
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Summary/Abstract |
The expectations for the role of civil society are growing due to an abysmal record of high-level political leadership in reaching an agreement and a sustainable peace process. How much impact can civil society have and what roles can it take in the peace process? This case study of South Korean civil society shows how the civil society was able to bridge the horizontal and vertical boundaries of the Korean conflict with the support of a global civil society, and created a hospitable public atmosphere for the peace process in the 1980s and 1990s. However, the space for the civil society to make a contribution in the Korean peace process required the interdependency of the roles of high-level and civil-society leadership in the interplay between the international and domestic political environments. The peacebuilding role of South Korean civil society demonstrates that the horizontal capacity of civil society alone cannot guarantee a breakthrough and sustainability in a peace process, but if it is coordinated with the vertical capacity, civil-society peacebuilding can be a useful platform for sustainable peacebuilding.
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14 |
ID:
170722
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15 |
ID:
160752
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Summary/Abstract |
The North Korean conundrum over the denuclearization issue following the Trump-Kim summit on June 12, 2018 in Singapore is getting murkier by the day as conflicting claims of credit on its outcome is being made by either side which analysts tend to see even pregnant with greater danger than what it was prior to the summit.
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16 |
ID:
054017
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Edition |
V.6
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Publication |
Seoul, Korea, Research Institute for National Unification(RINU), 1996.
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Description |
xi, 119p.
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
038471 | 355.0330519/KOR 038471 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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17 |
ID:
125267
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Publication |
2013.
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Summary/Abstract |
It is important to recognize how successful the U.S.-ROK Alliance has been for the past sixty years in deterring North Korea from attempting to unify the Korean Peninsula by force. This paper addresses Korea's unique status and examines its strong presence in meeting commitments to the international community. The future will require alliance-based cooperation with international partners to address challenges posed by the proliferation of WMD, which is one among many. In the end, however, the U.S.-ROK Alliance will only grow stronger, enhancing stability and security on the Peninsula.
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18 |
ID:
018535
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Publication |
Jan 2001.
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Description |
35-44
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19 |
ID:
082845
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Publication |
2008.
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Summary/Abstract |
The Nuclear Problem: Hopes and Disappointments ... The main achievement of 2007 in the solution of the nuclear problem on the Korean Peninsula, judging by the words of the participants in the six-party negotiations on the subject, as well as most experts, was the freezing and, some time later, the decommissioning of the main objects of the plutonium nuclear program of the DPRK - the gas-graphite reactor of 5-megawatt capacity and two enterprises: the first often called a radiochemical laboratory, which processed spent fuel, and another which produced fresh nuclear fuel. ...
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20 |
ID:
104227
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Publication |
2011.
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Summary/Abstract |
The state of the world in 2010 can be summed up in a single word: symbiosis. Chaos and change feed on each other in a phenomenon that mirrors the tendency towards change in today's international strategic landscape. This article attempts to create an overview of the most important features and trends of the situation by looking at shifts in major power relations, the rise of the Asia-Pacific region, geo-strategic upheavals, tension on the Korean peninsula, military security, world economy and China's diplomacy. It asserts that chaos is not necessarily a bad thing.
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