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| 1 |
ID:
161776
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| Summary/Abstract |
In response to the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative, China's overseas direct investment (ODI), especially whole or majority-ownership mergers and acquisitions, rose significantly in the belt-road countries, especially the ones along the continental route. Comparatively speaking, China's state-controlled acquirers played a leading role in infrastructure sectors, whereas the non-state-controlled acquirers were particularly active in non-infrastructure sectors. Central and West Asia, Western Europe and Russia are favorable destinations of Chinese ODI.
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| 2 |
ID:
119203
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
We identify the difference in market characteristics between different regions as an important determinant of the entry mode choices of foreign banks. The greater the difference in borrower quality between the developed and underdeveloped regions is, the more likely that the foreign bank to pursue Greenfield investment in the developed region. However, if the relative market size or the amount of borrowers in the underdeveloped region is large enough, the foreign bank tends to take stakes in a domestic bank operating in the underdeveloped region. Our findings provide valuable insights for explain observed organizational forms of foreign banks in China.
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| 3 |
ID:
173983
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| Summary/Abstract |
Although recently Chinese investment in the USA has grown exponentially, it has not flowed equally among the US states. Controlling for popular explanations in the foreign direct investment literature, we carry out subnational analysis to assess the determinants of Chinese investment in the USA. Using a panel dataset for all states from 2006 to 2016, we find that Chinese firms are more attracted to states where Republican governors hold office. Republican-governed states particularly attract greenfield investments from Chinese firms. However, we also find that US national security concerns and Chinese goals appear to affect investment flows in high-technology states, limiting the role of partisanship. Our results indicate that it is too soon to dismiss the importance of politics on foreign direct investment.
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