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| 1 |
ID:
188246
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| Summary/Abstract |
Through a progressive strengthening of organizational, legal, and personnel attributes, Argentina's Ministry of Defense has become civilianized. The MOD has been strengthened by the addition of new bureaucratic units headed by civilians with the authority to shape and conduct defense policy while also encouraging interactions with military personnel, resulting in better informed policy choices. This article will account for these changes through a detailed analysis of foreign affairs, strategic planning and promotions, production and research, and education. Procedural rules, divisions of labor and civil-military interactions are delineated. Military modernization deficiencies and the need for a permanent civilian staff are noted.
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| 2 |
ID:
119273
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In marked contrast with previous decades, defense issues in Argentina have started to receive increasing political attention over the last few years. The main goal of this article is to account for this new found interest in defense policy. The article contends that this revival could be accounted for by both the implementation of a neo-developmentalist strategy and a type of control that emphasizes civilian oversight over the armed forces. Both factors have promoted the implementation of policies that favored an increase in the military budget, the reconstruction of the defense industry and the establishment of a new military doctrine. This article evaluates the impact of factors that have not been previously considered by the literature on defense attention in South America.
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| 3 |
ID:
171220
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| Summary/Abstract |
Why did Argentina risk seizing the Malvinas/Falkland Islands by force in 1982, provoking a war against Great Britain, and what are the larger implications of this case? We revisit this influential episode using counterfactual analysis to interpret newly declassified declarations of high-ranking state officials involved in the decision to occupy the islands. These sources cast doubt on the diversionary-war and miscalculation theses of the Malvinas/Falklands War, among other extant interpretations. Evidence suggests long-term power dynamics and prospect theory better explain Argentine foreign policy behavior leading to the war. Due to aversion to tangible losses, the leadership of waning states like Argentina might favor risky military strategies despite their low expected utility. These biases may provoke a war if decision-making groups are small and isolated from de-biasing influences. Our explanation illustrates the value of prospect theory to understand why certain declining states behave aggressively and more plausibly explains the Malvinas/Falklands War when confronted to set-theoretic counterfactual analysis.
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