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| 1 |
ID:
156009
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| 2 |
ID:
155982
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| 3 |
ID:
150855
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| 4 |
ID:
176397
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| 5 |
ID:
151875
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| 6 |
ID:
119378
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| 7 |
ID:
154389
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| Summary/Abstract |
Hundreds of CAPF battalions have been raised and there is no reason they cannot deal with internal security issues. They must perform/be made to perform, and most importantly, dominate the Dandakaranya forest, where on occasional foray and chest-thumping are useless, Surely, we need to look at a more integrated and deeper approach including MHA taking direct responsibility and control of counter-maoists operations rather than merely dishing out CAPF units to states; reorganising CRPF units in CI role on the lines of Rashtriya Rifles/Assam Rifles; discontinue the practice of imposing IPS officers on CRPF organisations; give the CRPF their own officers, review their training and imbibe the culture of officers leading troops in operations and ensure unity of command. The MHA must get into the acto rather than bureaucrats looking over the shoulder towards the Army, and help our enemies in getting the army sucked in here too.
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| 8 |
ID:
162131
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| 9 |
ID:
125368
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Infantry modernisation has not received due importance in past decades. This must be treated as an 'emergent' requirement in consideration of the emerging threats from within and outside the country and against the backdrop of the level of sophistication being achieved by terrorists and insurgents. India must be prepared for short, intense hi-tech wars, in addition to expanding terrorism, asymmetric and fourth generation wars where the soldier faces the brunt at the cutting edge. Delay in modernisation has a direct bearing on combat efficiency in coping with threats to national security and may cost the lives of the infantrymen.
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| 10 |
ID:
150944
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| 11 |
ID:
172768
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| 12 |
ID:
122512
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| 13 |
ID:
122506
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| 14 |
ID:
125926
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Military's quest for Net Centric Warfare (NCW) capabilities has been ongoing. Intra-Service net-centricity in navy and air force is more because their weapon systems cannot function without it, but army is lagging behind. More significantly, inter-service NCW capability has made little headway. Lack of appropriate higher defence structures, void of network culture and inadequate political push, all are contributing factors. This, despite acknowledging that response to conflict situations need NCW capabilities and the Prime Minister declaring in 2004 during the Unified Commanders Conference, "Reforms within the armed forces also involve recognition of the fact that our navy, air forces and army can no longer function in compartments with exclusive chains of command and single service operational plans".
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| 15 |
ID:
119332
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| 16 |
ID:
125376
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
No matter the advancements in robotics, the importance of the 'man behind the machine' will remain relevant. This is equally applicable to Network Centric Warfare (NCW). The success of NCW rests on the idea that information is only useful if it enables more effective action. Significantly, the key to success of NCW is not technology but people who will use it - the human dimension, which is based on professional mastery and mission command requiring high standards of training, education, doctrine, organisation and leadership. It is about the way people collaborate to share their awareness of the situation in order to fight more effectively. The human dimension of NCW is complex, difficult to conceptualise and defence forces all over the globe are struggling with the issue, experimenting to achieve breakthroughs in varied measure.
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| 17 |
ID:
119370
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| 18 |
ID:
172755
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| 19 |
ID:
187453
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| 20 |
ID:
119348
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