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ID:
124983
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Publication |
2013.
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Summary/Abstract |
A majority of UN peacekeeping operations deployed to civil wars face violent attacks by rebel groups. To date, the academic study of this type of violence has been very limited. This article is a first attempt to fill this gap. In particular, I aim to examine why rebel groups fight against peacekeepers in some cases, while not in others. I argue that since peacekeepers are mostly impartial but not neutral, they become an actor in a conflict and tend to protect the weaker side from total defeat. This implies that on the one hand, relatively weaker rebels will seek protection from the government by peacekeepers. On the other hand, relatively stronger rebels will challenge the peacekeepers in order to restrict their behavior and/or make them withdraw. If stronger rebels are successful in targeting the peacekeepers and the peacekeepers withdraw or alter their behavior, a victory for these rebel groups should become easier. Using novel data on violence against UN peacekeepers, I find that indeed, stronger rebel groups are more likely to fight against peacekeepers.
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2 |
ID:
153626
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Summary/Abstract |
Violence against civilians is portrayed as an antecedent of civil war, a cause, or both. Civil war creates opportune environments for planning and carrying out these acts that in turn can have detrimental effects on peace processes. Since not all civil war factions will see peace as beneficial, some actors may use violence to undermine the peace talks. The rebels may use indiscriminate violence to demonstrate their ability to exact costs on the government thus forcing the latter to negotiate. This article focuses upon acts of violence committed by rebel groups during mediated peace process. The central hypothesis is that violence against civilians increases the probability of mediation that in turn increases the prospects for violence. Using all civil war episodes from 1970 to 2008 as observations results from bivariate probit analysis endogenizing the choice of mediation bear out this theoretical argument.
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3 |
ID:
167424
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Summary/Abstract |
Much of the violence carried out by rebels seeking secession or territorial autonomy occurs within the area under dispute. Still, territory-seeking rebels sometimes attack civilians in other parts of the country. By developing a diversionary theory of violence, this article helps explain why and when they do so. Rebels in territorial disputes aim to keep the government's forces out of their claimed homeland. Attacking civilians outside of the disputed area may help achieve this aim because it pushes the government to disperse its forces and commit resources to protection. Incentives for such diversionary violence are likely to prove particularly high during military offensives, when the government seeks to concentrate its forces in the contested area. I first assess the theory through a quantitative analysis of territorial conflicts worldwide between 1989 and 2015. Second, I conduct a case study of the Sri Lankan Eelam Wars, combining process-tracing and a quantitative test using new events data. I find that rebels do tend to escalate violence outside their claimed territory during government offensives and that diversion is an important causal mechanism.
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4 |
ID:
119401
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Publication |
2013.
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Summary/Abstract |
Celebration of Nigeria's economic recovery sits awkwardly with the realities of catastrophic poverty and unemployment in both the north and the south of the country.
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