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ID: 119691

Capital and opposition in Africa: coalition building in multiethnic societies / Arriola, Leonardo R

Arriola, Leonardo R	Journal Article
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2013.

Summary/Abstract

Under what conditions can opposition politicians with ethnic constituencies form electoral coalitions? In Africa's patronage-based political systems, incumbents form coalitions by using state resources to secure the endorsement of politicians from other ethnic groups. Opposition politicians, however, must rely on private resources to do the same. This article presents a political economy theory to explain how the relative autonomy of business from state-controlled capital influences the formation of multiethnic opposition coalitions. It shows that the opposition is unlikely to coalesce across ethnic cleavages where incumbents use their influence over banking and credit to command the political allegiance of business-the largest potential funder of opposition in poor countries. Liberalizing financial reforms, in freeing business to diversify political contributions without fear of reprisal, enable opposition politicians to access the resources needed to mimic the incumbent's pecuniary coalition-building strategy. A binomial logistic regression analysis of executive elections held across Africa between 1990 and 2005 corroborates the theoretical claim: greater financial autonomy for business-as proxied by the number of commercial banks and the provision of credit to the private sector-significantly increases the likelihood of multiethnic opposition coalitions being formed.

Key Words

Political System ; Africa ; Autonomy ; Electoral Coalitions ; Liberalizing Financial Reforms

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ID: 181566

Democratic Subversion: Elite Cooptation and Opposition Fragmentation / Arriola, Leonardo R

Arriola, Leonardo R	Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract

Incumbents in electoral regimes often retain power despite having to regularly compete in multiparty elections. We examine a specific channel through which incumbents can seek to prevent the emergence of a strong opposition that might threaten them in future elections. We present a formal model demonstrating that incumbents can strategically induce opposition fragmentation by appointing some opposition members to ministerial cabinet positions. Opposition politicians who have the opportunity to secure a cabinet position in an incumbent’s government tend to compete for office independently rather than coalescing into broad-based parties or electoral alliances. The model shows that weaker incumbents are more likely to rely on this cooptation strategy. Using original data on presidential elections across African countries during 1990–2016, we show that past cooptation of opposition politicians is associated with a more fragmented opposition field in subsequent elections.

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ID: 181863

Policing Institutions and Post-Conflict Peace / Arriola, Leonardo R; Dow, David A ; Matanock, Aila M.

Arriola, Leonardo R	Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract

How do policing institutions affect the prospects for peace in post-conflict settings? We present a principal-agent theoretical framework to explain how the institutional design of policing affects the recurrence of civil conflict. We argue that the fragmentation of police forces can reignite conflict dynamics by impeding coordinated action, undermining information sharing, and enabling agents to pursue their own interests. We test these expectations with the Police Force Organization Dataset (PFOD) on police forces in over 100 developing states. Our empirical analyses show that increasing the number of distinct police forces is systematically associated with an increased risk of conflict recurrence in post-conflict states. We also find that a larger number of police forces is associated with more abuse against civilian populations in post-conflict states, setting the stage for new grievances that may undermine peace.

Key Words

Institutions ; Police ; State capacity ; Civil Conflict

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