| Publication |
2013.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Institutions can contribute to regulating interethnic conflict; however, in many cases, they fail to bring about lasting peace. The article argues that the negligence of subgroup identities accounts for some of this failure. Ethnic groups are often treated as unitary actors even though most consist of various linguistic, tribal, or religious subgroups. When interethnic conflict is settled, subgroup differences may come back to the fore. This 'resurgence' can lead to subgroup conflict about the political and economic resources provided through intergroup institutional settlements. This can in turn undermine the peace-making effect of intergroup arrangements. Different subgroup identity constellations make such destructive effects more or less likely. The article focuses on self-government provisions in the aftermath of violent interethnic conflict and argues that lasting intergroup arrangements are especially challenging when they involve 'contested' ethnic groups.
|