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| 1 |
ID:
119826
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since 2004, the Government of Brazil (GoB) has acted as an intermediary between distribution and generator companies in the energy procurement sector. The GoB procures energy from generator companies through auctions of long-term energy contracts. After an auction, the winning generator companies sign contracts directly with distribution companies. In particular, the GoB runs two different auctions: one for energy from existing power plants (i.e., old energy) and another for energy from power plants that have not yet been built (i.e., new energy). This paper describes these auctions and compares the outcomes from the old and new energy auctions from 2004 to 2010 using final auction prices. The Brazilian case is particularly interesting, not only because energy is predominantly supplied by hydropower plants but also because new energy auctions reach prices below those for old energy. Therefore, it is likely that it is not necessary to run the two different energy auctions. As a secondary objective, this article analyze whether the Anglo-Dutch hybrid auction model is a better design for electricity procurement in Brazil.
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| 2 |
ID:
181769
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In this study, we analyze the long-term effects of the privatization of electricity distribution companies carried between 1995 and 2000 in Brazil using statistical analysis of regulatory indicators of privatized and the remaining state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The sample includes indicators concerning service quality, losses, operational costs, and profitability from 34 distribution companies between 2008 and 2019, representing 97% of the market in energy terms. According to the results, private ownership positively affects both quality and financial indicators considering regulatory goals. Therefore, the privatization program seems to have achieved its original goal. In addition, partially privatized SOEs have similar quality indicators to private companies but do not achieve operational costs and profitability similar to regulatory references. The financial reports of remaining SOEs indicate the controlling federal states did not receive a positive net sum of cash flow in the last nine years. Privatization of such companies should improve financial indicators while maintaining or improving the service quality, besides generating revenue to the controlling federal states.
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| 3 |
ID:
124226
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Auctions have been used in several formats in the electric energy industry. In general, regulators may be uncomfortable initiating a reverse auction at a higher-than-expected final price, fearing that participants may sell their energy at an excess profitability. Nevertheless, evidence from electricity procurement auctions conducted in Brazil supports the findings that these types of auctions have the opposite effect. By attracting a larger number of agents, these auctions can trigger stronger competition and lead to lower settlement pricing. Accordingly, the Brazilian cases examined in this article present significant evidence to support this directional theory. In fact, there are some cases of electricity procurement auctions that show that inadequate auction reserve pricing leads to inefficient outcomes and may also cause the auction to fail. On the other hand, auctions with adequate price caps have led to lower final clearing prices, thus contributing to reasonable final energy pricing.
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