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BRAZILIAN ELECTRICITY MARKET (2) answer(s).
 
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ID:   119826


Brazilian experience in electricity auctions: comparing outcomes from new and old energy auctions as well as the application of the hybrid Anglo-Dutch design / Rego, Erik Eduardo; Parente, Virginia   Journal Article
Rego, Erik Eduardo Journal Article
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Publication 2013.
Summary/Abstract Since 2004, the Government of Brazil (GoB) has acted as an intermediary between distribution and generator companies in the energy procurement sector. The GoB procures energy from generator companies through auctions of long-term energy contracts. After an auction, the winning generator companies sign contracts directly with distribution companies. In particular, the GoB runs two different auctions: one for energy from existing power plants (i.e., old energy) and another for energy from power plants that have not yet been built (i.e., new energy). This paper describes these auctions and compares the outcomes from the old and new energy auctions from 2004 to 2010 using final auction prices. The Brazilian case is particularly interesting, not only because energy is predominantly supplied by hydropower plants but also because new energy auctions reach prices below those for old energy. Therefore, it is likely that it is not necessary to run the two different energy auctions. As a secondary objective, this article analyze whether the Anglo-Dutch hybrid auction model is a better design for electricity procurement in Brazil.
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2
ID:   124226


Reserve price: lessons learned from Brazilian electricity procurement auctions / Rego, Erik Eduardo   Journal Article
Rego, Erik Eduardo Journal Article
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Publication 2013.
Summary/Abstract Auctions have been used in several formats in the electric energy industry. In general, regulators may be uncomfortable initiating a reverse auction at a higher-than-expected final price, fearing that participants may sell their energy at an excess profitability. Nevertheless, evidence from electricity procurement auctions conducted in Brazil supports the findings that these types of auctions have the opposite effect. By attracting a larger number of agents, these auctions can trigger stronger competition and lead to lower settlement pricing. Accordingly, the Brazilian cases examined in this article present significant evidence to support this directional theory. In fact, there are some cases of electricity procurement auctions that show that inadequate auction reserve pricing leads to inefficient outcomes and may also cause the auction to fail. On the other hand, auctions with adequate price caps have led to lower final clearing prices, thus contributing to reasonable final energy pricing.
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