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| 1 |
ID:
120007
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Do local systems of patronage in Indonesia cause or prevent intercommunal violence? In analysing the September 2010 ethnic riots in Tarakan, East Kalimantan, this article illustrates one mechanism by which clientelism can lead to violent communal conflict. Ethnic organizations claiming to represent the marginalized indigenous community engaged in a form of 'ethnic outbidding' in order to intimidate their way into local patronage networks. Apparent leadership of an aggrieved indigenous community gave organizations access to state resources that they would not otherwise have had. In order to sustain this status, however, these organizations were obliged to respond vigorously to any apparent insults to the community, thereby increasing the risks of intercommunal conflict.
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| 2 |
ID:
139633
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| Summary/Abstract |
Politics in Kenya remains vulnerable to ethnic tensions despite its openness and vibrancy, but it can also be argued that Kenyan politics is becoming increasingly mature. This article explains the political economy dynamics behind the first two orderly presidential successions in post-colonial Kenya. It proposes a conceptual framework that shows how instrumental ethnicity plays out in a quasi-differentiated society in which ethnic organizations are the key conduits for the flow of rents between political and economic elites. More specifically, it shows how the internal fragmentation of ethnic groups intensifies the structural uncertainties that are commonly associated with intra-elite pacts in weakly institutionalized polities. It is argued that the 1978 and 2002 presidential successions in Kenya were orderly, paradoxically, because some of the crucial political and ethnic organizations were fragmented to the extent that they created conditions of great uncertainty for the elite. In this context, the rule of law was upheld as a last-ditch strategy to mitigate uncertainties in the face of rampant fragmentation. This shows that ultimately elite fragmentation can generate political stability provided that there is enough at stake for the elites.
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