| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
101029
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2010.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
For the Mumbai attacks of 26 November 2008, the Lashakr-e-Taiba recived training, funding and technical gadgets from the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) Pakistan, Middle East countries and United States (US) based companies restively. Fomenting insurgencies and supporting terrorism has been a major component of Pakistan's national strategy, especially against India. Yet t Indian security agencies are still badly trained and poorly equipped. Although, global cooperation is essential in combating international terrorism, the US has adopted selective rather than unified and comprehensive cunterterrorism measures to deal with this scourge in South Asia. It is no secret that the real rulers in Pakistan are the army and the ISI and at times they dwarf the civilian government in decision-making. If extremist forces take over Afghanistan and Pakistan, the world will become significantly less secure. However, international cooperation is not an entitlement and India must firs set its own house in order
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
112196
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
159378
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
States commonly take one of three approaches to militant groups on their soil: collaboration; benign neglect; or belligerence. All three approaches are present in Pakistan, where some groups also move back and forth among these categories. I employ the term “coopetition” to capture this fluidity. The dynamic nature of militancy in Pakistan makes the country an excellent laboratory for exploring a state’s assessment of the utility an Islamist militant group offers, and the threat it poses relative to other threats informs the state’s treatment of that group. In this article, I put forward a typology that situates Islamist militants in Pakistan in one of the above four categories. I also illustrate how a group’s identity, objectives, and alliances inform assessments of its utility and threat relative to other threats. In addition to enhancing our understanding of militant–state dynamics, this taxonomy builds on and helps to unify earlier typologies of Pakistani militancy.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
115968
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
170631
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Jihadism’ (also known as the jihadi movement) is a popular term that signifies the Islamic terror movement which thrives on extremist ideologies and violence. In addition to the conventional practices, the online medium is currently being employed for disseminating these extremist ideologies across the globe. Radicalisation and recruitment of geographically dispersed individuals as ‘jihadists’ for supporting Islamic terror activities tend to be the primary intent for using the digital platforms as the medium of communication in this context. One such initiative by the Lashkar-e-Taiba of Jammu and Kashmir was the release of the ‘Wyeth: The Resistance in Flow’, an e-magazine which was launched on April 2018. The first issue which was posted with an open access option was primarily designed to influence the Indian youth population through the radical interpretations of Islam. Hence, it is crucial to analyse and understand the jihadi discourse of the Wyeth magazine in order to curb and counter-attack such initiatives at its initial phase. For this purpose, the present study aims to examine the content of the Wyeth magazine and analyse the basic traits of the jihadi propaganda and its potential to aid in the self-radicalisation process.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 6 |
ID:
129381
|
|
|
| 7 |
ID:
113648
|
|
|
| 8 |
|
| 9 |
ID:
132879
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2014.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
India has been confronting jihadist violence for decades. Although expeditionary terrorism by Pakistani militants typically receives the most focus, indigenous actors, many benefitting from Pakistani support, are responsible for the majority of jihadist attacks in India. Yet the dynamics of Indian jihadism remain under-explored. This article examines the Indian Mujahideen (IM), which constitutes the primary indigenous jihadist threat. It argues the IM is best understood as a label for a network of modules, with a loose leadership, that is connected to smaller, self-organizing clusters of would-be militants as well as to foreign militant groups like the Pakistani Lashkar-e-Taiba.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 10 |
ID:
107029
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
Gurgaon, Hachette India, 2011.
|
| Description |
xiv, 314p.
|
| Standard Number |
9789350092521, hbk
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 056185 | 363.3250954/GUP 056185 | Main | Withdrawn | General | |
|
|
|
|
| 11 |
ID:
109720
|
|
|
| 12 |
ID:
141032
|
|
|
|
|
| Edition |
1st ed.
|
| Publication |
New Delhi, Routledge, 2015.
|
| Description |
xviii, 493p.: ill.hbk
|
| Standard Number |
9781138191273
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 058325 | 355.033054/KUM 058325 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
|
|
|
|
| 13 |
ID:
149286
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
Oxon, Routledge, 2016.
|
| Description |
xvii, 442p.: ill.hbk
|
| Standard Number |
9781138282841
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 058900 | 355.033054/KUM 058900 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
|
|
|
|
| 14 |
ID:
111038
|
|
|
| 15 |
ID:
131340
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2014.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article uses a novel database of 1,625 posthumously published biographies of members of two Islamist militant organizations (Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM)), all of whom were killed in the course of carrying out militant attacks. In general, each biography provides data on the militant's birthplace, education, recruitment, and training. The number of observations in this database is a full order of magnitude larger than those of previous databases assembled from militant biographies. While the sample of militants in this database is the product of multiple selection effects, analysis of the database undermines many common myths about Pakistani militants and casts doubt on current policy approaches to mitigating Islamist militancy in Pakistan.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 16 |
ID:
152016
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Pakistan has an uneven history of dealing with insurgencies and extremism. This article identifies the various campaigns and policies employed to defeat militants and deal with violent extremism. It describes the major anti-state groups and how Pakistan’s military and civilian leaders, relying on the related strategies of selectivity, gradualism and containment, have allowed militancy and terrorism to thrive. This article finds that while the elites and the public may have belatedly come to appreciate the existential internal threats these groups pose to the country, there are strong reasons to doubt the state’s full commitment to its promises to take meaningful action.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 17 |
ID:
118621
|
|
|
| 18 |
ID:
141544
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
New Delhi, Springer (India) Private Limited, 2013.
|
| Description |
xiv, 231p.hbk
|
| Standard Number |
9788132213352
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 058330 | 363.3205491/SUB 058330 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
|
|
|
|
| 19 |
ID:
126749
|
|
|
| 20 |
ID:
092674
|
|
|